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8 
Introduction   
 
Solidarity is an inherent component of the European integration process as well as a guide to 
its legal construction. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly mentions solidarity in many different 
contexts and elevates it to a legal principle. Within the current stage of integration and against 
the backdrop of several new and nuanced challenges – ranging from renewable energy 
promotion to migration –academic debate and European Union case law struggle to construct 
a definition or workable concept of solidarity that enables a wide-ranging application of this 
ubiquitous principle. A clear interpretation of solidarity within European Union law is, 
however, necessary in order to capture and assess unilateral actions of Member States that are 
addressed to objectives to be jointly achieved. Understood in this broader sense, solidarity is 
not only a negative obligation to abstain from harming or undermining Treaty objectives; it is 
also a positive obligation to work towards a goal or joint action. Without such a two-pronged 
conceptualization, the concept of solidarity risks becoming a vague or even nugatory principle 
within the Treaties, which struggles to achieve a clear and useable definition This thesis will 
therefore aim at a three-fold objective: To understand what a legal principle of solidarity is; to 
understand what a legal principle of solidarity does and finally; to give examples of recent 
case law supporting the proposed interpretation. When examined from a broader perspective, 
the principle of solidarity in European Union law is found to entail three dimensions. First, 
solidarity is a positive obligation to achieve the aims set forth. Second, solidarity is a negative 
obligation to not to undermine the objectives set forth. Third, solidarity is a supplement to the 
proportionality test to add a moral claim to the Court’s balancing act. This thesis makes a 
distinction between the ex ante existence and the ex post application of solidarity to gain a 
more effective understanding of the concept of solidarity operating in two temporal 
dimensions. The ex ante existence of solidarity represents the Member States’ promise of 
cooperation through the principle of conferral and sincere cooperation. The ex post existence 
of solidarity is the judicial evaluation of whether or not the promise has been kept. Hence 
solidarity binds the entire range of Member State actions from a perspective of joint action 
agreed upon ex ante and a duty not to undermine, and to promote joint action ex post.   
 
The interesting question here is whether there is room in the debate for a more ambitious 
claim for solidarity. Instead of asking whether unilateral action fulfills either the principle of 
proportionality or of sincere cooperation, a supervising court should also ask whether a state´s 
action is within the spirit of solidarity as explicitly mentioned in the Treaties.  
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This thesis attempts to demonstrate how such a line of argumentation is already being shaped, 
how a legal principle of solidarity applies both ex ante and ex post, and finally, why this line 
of inquiry is a necessary supplement to the principle of proportionality in European Union 
law. The interaction between the different principles is mirrored in the theory used within the 
thesis. This thesis’ methodology and purpose seeks to address this lacuna by translating 
Sangiovanni´s theory of solidarity as joint action into a legal interpretation of how recent case 
law is evolving within European Union law. 1 The thesis uses this theory as a basis for how 
solidarity as joint action could be translated into a more fine-grained tool for assessing 
unilateral measures. The ex ante existence of solidarity therefore remains a description as to 
how Member States have agreed upon a joint action. “Sub plans” are different measures taken 
unilaterally by the Member States within the ambit of the objective to be achieved. To achieve 
the objectives and act in solidarity, these unilateral sub plans need to mesh. Thus, unilateral 
actions within a principle of solidarity need to respond both to a negative obligation not to 
undermine Union objectives as well as a positive obligation to fulfill the aims pursued.  
 
The actual application of the principle ex post is better to be understood as a reinforced 
principle of proportionality, veering unilateral actions towards the aim to be achieved. This 
would indirectly create a bridge to a wider interpretation of a legal principle of solidarity in 
European Union law. Not only does the emerging form of reinforced principle of 
proportionality add more elements to the proportionality test used by the Court. The 
reinforced proportionality test also aims to verify whether or not unilateral sub plans mesh 
(i.e. operate in concert).  This concept is inherent to the theory of solidarity as joint action.  
 
The ex ante aspect of solidarity is not to be coerced. It can however function as a binding 
principle – and thus be open to coercion - when the objectives to be achieved by the virtue of 
solidarity have been agreed upon previously. As such, it becomes clear that solidarity as a 
legal principle serves as a foundation with its ex ante existence as well as a reminder of the 
obligations through its ex post application.  This thesis will underline that the existence of 
solidarity as a legal principle ex ante could be interpreted as existing in the interstices 
between the principle of sincere cooperation and the principle of conferral.  
                                                
1 Andrea Sangiovanni Solidarity as Joint Action 32 J of Applied Phil 340 (2015.) (“Sangiovanni Joint Action”.) 
In this vein, unilateral actions are described or defined as “sub plans” by Sangiovanni, who borrows this 
terminology from Michael Bratman. See e.g. Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on 
Intention and Agency (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
(“Bratman Faces of Intention”)  
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Further, the actual application of the principle ex post is better understood if a reinforced 
principle of proportionality is used to balance the unilateral actions towards the aim to be 
achieved. Nevertheless, there is no moral claim within proportionality balancing and thus the 
Court interacts with a second reminder of the principle of solidarity as such – adding a 
different layer to the proportionality test. The interaction between these ex ante and ex post 
notions of solidarity is mirrored in the theory used within the thesis. This theory is the basis 
for examining how solidarity as joint action could be translated into a more fine-grained tool 
for assessing unilateral measures. These “sub plans” are different measures taken unilaterally 
by the Member States within the ambit of the objective to be achieved. Solidarity as such has 
a function similar to the operation of the Hippocratic Oath in the sense of “First do no harm” 
plus “I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment.”2 
 
In the first part, this thesis aims to explore solidarity from a theoretical standpoint.  It will 
attempt to define the term, outline a roadmap towards the principle as well discussing current 
developments. The purpose of this thesis is to translate Sangiovanni´s thesis into legal terms 
and properly reframe the model into a legal understanding of solidarity in European Union 
law.  
 
The second part will explain the ex ante existence of solidarity in European Union Law. It 
will do so by taking into consideration both the principle of sincere cooperation as well as the 
principle of conferral. These principles will be seen in light of the theoretical framework 
proposed by Sangiovanni.  
 
Third, the ex post application of solidarity will use examples of recent case law that may 
illustrate how the Court of Justice interprets how sub plans or unilateral actions mesh. This 
interpretation is seen through the lenses of solidarity as joint action.  
The last part will explore the fine line between the principle of proportionality and the 
importance of solidarity in the future architecture of European Union law. This will also 
includes a discussion of the existence of a reinforced principle of proportionality and the 
necessity of principle of solidarity in European Union law.  
                                                
2 More accurately, “Also I will, according to my ability and judgment, prescribe a regimen for the health of the 
sick; but I will utterly reject harm and mischief”. Lat. “Victus quoque rationem ad aegrotantium salutem pro 
facultate, judicioque me o adhibebo, noxam vero et maleficium propulsabo”. 
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1 Solidarity Explained: A Theoretical Standpoint  
With the increasing scope and complexity of Union tasks, solidarity has been studied by an 
increasing number of scholars. The German school has, in this area, been a guiding reference 
shaping the solidarity debate from a legal perspective.3 The focus of this research primarily 
incorporates a positivist “pacta sunt servanda” international law perspective on Member State 
obligations to the Union as found in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention’s (“VC”) principle 
that: “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty”.  This is, for example, the function of Article 69 TFEU which requires National 
Parliaments to consider matters concerning judicial and police obligations in criminal matters 
in light of their subsidiarity obligations.   
 
However, the increasing importance of shared competences and three-party interaction 
between the Union and Member States and among Member States inter se has created a 
demand for the inclusion of a different, more active role for “solidarity” within the principle 
of “sincere cooperation” now found in Article 4 (3) TEU and the possibility of “enhanced 
cooperation” under Article 326-334 TFEU. Both sincere cooperation and enhanced 
cooperation have a positive, albeit voluntary, obligation to them. Because the needs of the 
modern state and of the evolving Union are increasingly more complex and technical, and 
problems arise and multiply within shorter time spans, ex post proportionality balancing alone 
can neither keep up with the changing landscape, nor predict solutions for new issues or the 
unexpected consequences of improperly coordinated networks 
 
A different examination is required of Member State actions which are not reactive solely to 
ex post judicial coercion as a form of negative abstention from harm as in Article 18 VC, but 
rather to a form of positive solidarity similar to esprit des corps whose operation is ex ante to 
the activity. One academic working from that perspective is Andrea Sangiovanni who 
conceptualises solidarity as joint action.  
 
                                                
3 Christian Calliess Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union 2d ed (Nomos, Baden 
Baden, 1999) (“Calliess Subsidiaritäts“.); Roland Bieber "Gegenseitige Verantwortung – Grundlage des 
Verfassungsprinzips der Solidarität in der Europäischen Union" (“Bieber”) in Calliess Subsidiaritäts; Armin von 
Bogdandy "Founding Principles" (Bogdandy Founding Principles”) in Principles of European Constitutional 
Law 2d revised ed Armin von Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast Eds (Oxford Hart Publishing Ltd 2011) ("Bogdandy 
Principles of Constitutional Law"); Karel Wellens, “Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-) Emerging Constitutional 
Principle: Some Further Reflections”, (“Wellens”) in Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law 
Rudiger Wolfrum and Chie Kojima Eds (Heidelberg Springer 2010) (“Wolfrum and Kojima”) 
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This theoretical framework is designed to depict how unilateral Member State actions are 
designed to “mesh” with actions taken by other Member States toward a common goal (much 
like the construction of the different nodes in a communication network which must operate 
together if the network is to function properly.) Solidarity comes into play here in the initial 
conceptual construction of such actions, ex ante, without the complications stemming from 
justifying the action ex post in the context of judicial review. The application of solidarity as a 
legal principle ex post is also incorporated in the model. What is needed for understanding 
Member State/Member State action is a different, more Kantian perspective, “act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.”4 The consequences of not knowing how to apply, define, or interpret solidarity 
as a legal principle of European Union law can be quite severe. A lack of an effective means 
of interpretation hampers a reading of recent cases whose meaning has puzzled practitioners 
and scholars alike.5  Likewise, inadequate interpretive tools detract from legal argumentation 
based on moral claims that exist within the ambit of European Union law. It also risks 
confusion in comparisons with market based claims and the more neutral, balancing act 
between advantages and obligations.6 The principle also serves to remind us why and how 
European integration may not be reduced to a mere calculation of costs and benefits, or as the 
Court of Justice and its AG assert: 
 
For a state unilaterally to break, according to its own conception of national interest, the equilibrium 
between the advantages and obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community brings into 
question the equality of Member States before community law and creates discrimination at the expense 
of their nationals. This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their 
adherence to the community strikes at the very root of the community legal order. 7 
 
How would it be possible to deepen the solidarity between the peoples of Europe and to envisage ever-
closer union between those peoples, as advocated in the Preamble to the EU Treaty, without solidarity 
between the Member States when one of them is faced with an emergency situation? I am referring here 
to the quintessence of what is both the raison d`être and the objective of the European project.8 
 
                                                
4 Immanuel Kant Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals [1785] Allen W. Wood Trans and Ed (London 
Yale University Press 2002) AK 4:21, Section I p 37 
5 I refer here to the Ålands Vindkraft, Essent and Hungary/Slovakia cases discussed infra in the subsequent 
chapters. My understanding from these cases is that Advocate General Yves Bot has paved the way for a new 
found understanding and interpretation of solidarity as a legal principle in European Union law.  
6 For a detailed account of solidarity as a legal principle see Alain Supiot La Solidarité: Enquête sur un principe 
juridique (Paris Odile Jacob 2015) (“Supiot”)  
7  Case C-128/78 Commission v UK, 7 February 1979 (“Tachographs”) ECR [1979] 419 par 12. The 
Tachographs case has been widely used as a point of departure for the principle of solidarity within European 
Union law, see Calliess Subsidiaritäts-fn 3 supra p. 18 (citing and discussing Tachographs para 12.)  
8 Opinion of AG Bot delivered 26 July 2017 in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/17 Slovak Republic and 
Hungary v Council ECLI:EU:C:2017:618 (“Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council”) para. 17  
  
 
13 
Is there then room for a more ambitious claim that, instead of asking two bifurcated questions, 
whether a state´s action fulfils the principle of proportionality or the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the better question is whether the state´s action lies within the spirit of solidarity 
as explicitly mentioned in the Treaties. Translated from Sangiovanni´s terms to legal 
argumentation, unilateral actions are proportionate to the aim pursued when they fulfil the 
criteria for a legal principle of solidarity within their ex ante and ex post applications.9 As 
applied to recent legal developments this enables a dual, holistic understanding of the ex ante 
existence and an ex post application of solidarity in the form a legal principle in European 
Union law, a conceptualisation that has hitherto been lacking. 
1.1 An Attempt to Define the Term  
Solidarity as a concept entered European integration policy and discourse in the Schuman 
Declaration of 9 May 1950 as “solidarité de fait”. The Preamble to the ECSC Treaty 
enshrined the concept as part of the output legitimacy resulting from common efforts towards 
economic development: “CONSCIENTS que l'Europe ne se construira que par des 
réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait, et par l'établissement de bases 
communes de développement économique; …” This was followed by the Treaty of Rome’s 
assertion of its existence: “ENTENDANT confirmer la solidarité qui lie l'Europe et les pays 
d'outremer, et désirant assurer le développement de leur prospérité, conformément aux 
principes de la Charte des Nations-Unies, …”  
 
The Lisbon Treaty incorporated “solidarity” as one of its goals in Article 2 TEU and uses the 
term sixteen other times within the Treaties in several different contexts. Arguably, “while the 
principle [of solidarity] has been used in a variety of ways by the [European] institutions, at 
no stage there has been any attempt to define the term. The EU institutions appear to apply the 
elephant test: you know it if you see it.”10 If we do not know what solidarity means in 
European Union law or what function it serves, its mentioning in the Treaties as well as in 
case law could be void. This is a problem, both moral and legal, if the European Union 
claims, in Article 2 TEU, to be based upon “solidarity”.  
 
                                                
9 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra 
10 Catherine Barnard, “Solidarity and the Commission’s ’Renewed Social Agenda’” (“Barnard”) in Promoting 
Solidarity in the European Union Malcom Ross and Yuri Borgman-Prebil Eds (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010) (Ross and Prebil”) p. 81 
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It is even possible to go as far as to reiterate the claim that solidarity is the basis of law or that 
« [l]e fondement du droit est la solidarité »11. Most of the discourse of solidarity as a legal 
principle has focused, inter alia, on legal dogmatic analyses of whether or not solidarity may 
be seen as a legal principle12; whether it is a structural principle of international law;13 how 
can it be understood within the European Union legal order;14 how it is connected to the 
principle of subsidiarity and environmental protection;15 how it can result in the redistributive 
effects deemed necessary for the welfare state;16 how it can be understood as a non-market-
based principle, and a stranger to the internal market paradigm,17 and finally, how it may be 
held to be a constitutional principle as such.18  
 
In the following I will describe some of the developments and some of the inspirations for this 
understanding of solidarity as a legal principle and its inherent nature. The main theoretical 
framework for this is Sangiovanni´s theory of solidarity as joint action. Translated into 
Member State action, the following elements are essential to the understanding of solidarity 
within European Union law:   
1. [Member States] (a) share a goal to overcome some significant adversity;  
2. [Member States] individually intend to do their part in achieving the shared goal in ways that mesh;  
3. [Member States] are individually committed (a) to the realisation of the shared goal and (b) to not 
bypass each other´s will in the achievement of the goal;  
4. [Member States] are disposed (a) to incur significant costs to realise their goal; and (b) to share one 
another´s fates in ways relevant to the shared goal.  
 
Facts 1.-4. Need not be common knowledge.19 
The gravamen of the problem stems fromm the fact that a close cousin of the principle of 
solidarity has primarily been applied ex post after the decisions of the Member States. This is 
better known as the principle of proportionality when unilateral member state action has 
become subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice.  
                                                
11 Roland Bieber fn 3 supra p. 72 (Quoting from Léon Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel, 2. Aufl. Bd. 3, 
1923, s. 595.)  
12 Esin Küçük Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive Political Statement or a Legal Principle with Substance? 23 
Maastricht J of Eur and Comp L 966 (2016) (“Küçük”)  
13 Wellens fn. 3 supra 
14 Cf. Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3supra Bieber fn 3 supra, and; Ingolf Pernice "Solidarität in Europa – Eine 
Ortsbestimmung im Verhältnis zwischen Bürger, Staat und Europäischer Union" in Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3 
supra pp 25 et seq. (“Pernice”) 
15 Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3 supra 
16 Floris de Witte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity, Oxford Studies in European 
Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 
17 Supiot fn 6 supra 
18 Bogdandy Principles of Constitutional Law fn. 3 supra  
19 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn. 1 supra, at p. 343 
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Yet, there is also a need for a legal principle of solidarity which may also be applied and 
understood ex ante, before requiring the interaction of an adjudicatory body, as well as ex 
post, thus adding a layer of morality or ethical behaviour to the proportionality test. These two 
temporal dimensions are of equal importance to understanding what solidarity as a legal 
principle actually does. Instead of being solely an after-the-fact, result-oriented approach, an 
ex ante application of solidarity as a legal principle places greater emphasis on formative 
processes and their bases in adherence to the Treaties. Between the ex ante existence and the 
ex post application of the principle lies the vehicle of the decisions made by the Member 
States in light of European Union law. Between the ex ante existence and ex post application 
of solidarity lies the decision of the Member State to act, framed between existing EU law and 
the review of the Member State´s choice by the European Court of Justice. Küçük however 
concludes:  
Considering the fact that solidarity is a politically loaded concept, one may understand the Court’s 
reluctance in employing solidarity as a legal instrument when it was possible to address the issue by 
using conventional arguments or technical analysis … solidarity appears as an instrument for the 
creation of a common good, from which all the contributors benefit – if not immediately, then in the 
distance future. Seen from this perspective, solidarity can be regarded as a legal principle that is less 
amorphous and equivocal than it may seem at first sight.20  
 
It is particularly the Member State’s intention to create that common good and the necessity 
to go beyond mere technical analyses that are key to grasping the importance of solidarity as a 
legal principle of European Union law. As framed by Malcolm Ross, “solidarity already 
occupies a significant place in the constitutional acquis of the EU and is explicitly enhanced 
by the ratified Lisbon Treaty”.21 The most relevant provisions for our purposes are those 
related to a spirit of solidarity, e.g. Articles 4 (3) and 21 (1) TEU, and Articles 80, 122, 194 
and 222 TFEU. On this view, “the existence of solidarity is not an unwritten principle but a 
part of the substantive written positive law of the European Union”.22 Armin von Bogdandy 
characterises solidarity as the “last classical principle of European constitutionalism”.23 In the 
following, a roadmap towards a principle will describe the current academic discourse. This 
will be followed by a discussion of a progressive change of the principle of solidarity through 
extended interpretation.   
                                                
20 Esin Küçük fn 12 supra p. 983 (Citing Cases C-370/12 Pringle v Ireland (Full Court) 27 November 2012 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 and C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (GC)16 June 2015.) 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.) 
21 Malcom Ross, “Solidarity - A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?” (“Ross”) in Ross and Prebil fn 10 
supra p 36. 
22 Bieber fn 3 supra p. 69 (My translation.)  
23 Bogdandy Founding Principles fn 3 supra p 53. 
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1.1.1 A Roadmap Towards a Principle  
There are certainly no lack of interpretations of solidarity as achieving common goals or 
facilitating joint action because “[s]olidarity is enshrined within the European Union’s genetic 
code with the European Union, the Member States have committed themselves, on the basis 
of common values, to reach common objectives… ”.24 How then do we create a roadmap to 
better understand the evolution of the principle and its future trajectory? Within the European 
Union, German constitutional law scholars have taken the lead in raising questions regarding 
its moral and legal nature.25 Within the solidarity debate, a sceptical view has emerged which 
may be summarised by the following statement: “[a]lthough international solidarity is an 
important moral principle and a moral commitment, it does not meet the requirements of a 
legal concept.”26   
 
Further, “[a]s long as solidarity is endorsed in the context of the lex ferenda, who can oppose 
it?” But sheer belief in solidarity as lex ferenda does not turn it into solid lex lata”.27 What has 
come to be known as the sceptical view focuses on solidarity’s lack of legal properties.28 This 
debate has been somewhat nuanced due to recent contributions in the field which appear to 
agree that solidarity may be deemed to be a legal principle, as such.29 Another aspect that 
captures the essence of the legal debate is the fact that the principle of solidarity is no longer 
an auxiliary function but is well on its way to achieving a permanent status of normative 
superiority.30 It is further, this normative claim that is helpful when assessing the added-value 
of solidarity as a principle when applied to the proportionality test.  
 
Solidarity is often more than not a term invoked “when all else fails”.31 Such an inconsistent 
invocation of the legal principle of solidarity leads us astray. A search for a more coherent 
interpretation is needed, in order to avoid both a misuse and a misunderstanding of the 
                                                
24 Bieber fn. 3 supra p. 68. Bieber further questions the reason why solidarity is enshrined only in some specific 
provisions of the Treaty and as such, whether it might be a general principle applicable in every field: “Auch ist 
unklar, welche Bedeutung es hat, dass Solidarität nur an einzelnen Stellen des Vertrages genannt wird, obwohl 
man annehmen konnte, dass es sich um ein allgemein gültiges Prinzip handelt”. (At p. 70.) 
25 See e.g. Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3 supra.  
26 Point 23 GA/71/280 Human rights and international solidarity Note by the Secretary General transmitting the 
Report of the Independent Expert 3 August 2016 (“GA/71/280”) p. 9  
27  Dinstein´s comments p 79 on Dann´s paper Philip Dann, “Solidarity and the Law of Development 
Cooperation”, in Wellens fn.  3 supra pp 55 – 93 (“Dann”) 
28 Dienstein in Wellens fn. 3 supra p. 79 
29 Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3 supra; Ingolf Pernice fn 14 supra; and Bieber fn. 3 supra  
30 Karel Wellens fn 3 supra pp 37 and 40.  
31 Emmanuel Melissaris, On Solidarity (June 5, 2017). LSE Leg. Stud. W P No. 10/2017. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980766 
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concept itself. It is also not this author´s intention to support a naïve presumption that this 
principle is, in Tuori’s terms, a “global master principle” capable of solving all transnational 
legal challenges or uncertainty.32 Nevertheless, it can achieve some clarity as to what 
solidarity entails. According to Dienstein, Duguit´s concept of solidarity is not:  
… entirely dissimilar to Hans Kelsen´s “Grundnorm”, i. e., an axiomatic meta-juridical concept that 
underpins the international legal system … The real question … is whether the principle of solidarity can be 
regarded not as a meta-juridical notion but as part and parcel of positive international law, that is to say, 
either custom or Treaty.33 
 
It is also quite important to address the question of what sort of moral obligations solidarity 
might entail. This analysis will be complemented by a theoretical framework for the analysis 
as mentioned in the introduction. Andrea Sangiovanni´s theory of solidarity as joint action 
provides an instrument that is important, suggesting the possible interactions between the 
principles of EU law that may create a coherent interpretation of solidarity.34 Such an 
interpretation is necessary in order to gain more clarity within legal argumentation based on 
solidarity as a principle of European Union law.  
As Kotzur and Schmalenbach argue, “[e]ven though international solidarity is a highly 
amorphous concept, a legal examination about the relevance of the principle requires a certain 
grasp of the term’s meaning and attribution”.35 As a legal principle,36 “[s]olidarity may be 
used to describe and explain the normal order and normative social integration in societies 
and communities, as opposed to chaos and conflict, and as opposed to order based on 
coercion or maximization of self-interest”.37  
 
                                                
32 Kaarlo Tuori, “Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids and Perspectivism” in Transnational Law: Rethinking 
European Law and Legal Thinking Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari Eds, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) (“Tuori Transnational law”) p. 38. Where he adds: 
The search for a new, harmonising, global master principle capable of addressing legal transnationalism has pursued 
both descriptive/explanatory and normative aims, often enough intertwined. Scholars have longed for both a basic grid 
of interpretation, rendering the new global constellation of law intelligible, and a normative paradigm that would 
facilitate the creation of coherence in the fragmented legal world, and by the same token, enhance law’s legitimacy. The 
meta-level order of orders aspired for displays both intellectual and normative features. 
33 Dinstein´s comments p 79 on Dann´s paper, fn. 26 supra (Where he argues, ”I see merit in a philosophical 
debate about solidarity in such a meta-juridical context, but clearly this will not suffice for the purposes of [a 
structural principle of law]” Perhaps this question might be framed as a “morality of duty” in the “thou shalt not” 
form theorized by Fuller See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law Rev. Ed 35th Printing (New Haven, Yale 
University Press1969) (“The Morality of Law”) pp 5-6. 
34 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra. 
35 Markus Tobias Kotzur and Kirsten Schmalenbach, Solidarity Among Nations, Archic des Våolkerrechts, Bd. 
52, S. 68-91, Mohr Siebeck 2014, DOI 10.1628/000389214X14056754359545 p. 89 (“Kotzur and 
Schmalenbach”.) 
36 Wellens, fn 3 supra. 
37 Arto Laitinen and Anna Birgitta Pessi, Solidarity Theory and Practice Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi 
Eds (New York, Lexington Books 2014) (“Laitinen & Pessi”) p 2. 
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The existence and application of the legal principle of solidarity is closely connected to its 
interpretation qua principle. Solidarity can also be usefully developed as a tool which 
enhances legal certainty, both for its duty bearers and for its rights holders. 38 Simon 
Derpmann is one of the critical voices within this debate, claiming that solidarity should be a 
specific type of obligation:   
A theory of solidarity is of systematic value within moral philosophy, only if it provides an account of 
solidarity as a specific type of obligation that can be distinguished from others. If it cannot explain in what 
regards obligations of solidarity are different from, go beyond, or are more specific than obligations of 
justice, fidelity, respect, or benevolence, then there is arguably no need for a distinct theory of solidarity 
within moral philosophy. So, a convincing exposition of solidarity requires the fulfilment of a condition of 
conceptual discriminability and its contribution to the systematic analysis of moral obligation.39 
 
Solidarity, it turns out, is indeed a legal principle in search of a coherent understanding. The 
following sections will therefore provide the background necessary to understanding how the 
various parts may fit together and to provide a basis for the ex ante existence and ex post 
application of solidarity as a principle of European Union law.  
There has been little attention paid to asking what a legal principle of solidarity actually 
does.40 If solidarity is perceived as a founding principle of European Union law, “[it] should 
be regarded as an essential element of a common language of conflict resolution”.41  
It is significant that this common language of conflict resolution was first applied to 
undertakings’ obligations and subsequently to Member State obligations. Malcolm Ross 
underlines that: 
… the positioning of solidarity as an emerging constitutional value suggest [that] solidarity becomes capable 
of shaping or directing other core values and legal institution … a fundamental status to solidarity implies 
that it should apply unless there are good reasons for departing from it as a principle – in much the same 
way that the principles of equal treatment or non-discrimination have developed in the European legal 
order.42  
 
                                                
38 In the UN draft declaration, United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council 26th Sess. Report of the 
Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity A/HRC/26/34, 1 April 2014 (and Addendum I) 
(“GA Report A/HRC/26/34”) point 29. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Pages/ListReports.aspx. (Last visit 4 July 
2017.) – duty bearers are states and non-state actors 
39 Simon Derpmann, “Moral Recognition and Communality”, in Laitinen & Pessi, fn 37 supra p. 107.  
40 One exception to this is perhaps be Calliess’ work on solidarity, see Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn. 3 supra. 
Nevertheless, that is another contribution focusing on the failure of solidarity and not the reason for its 
reinforcement or emergence as such. In the regional consultation on the proposed draft declaration on the rights 
of peoples and individuals to international solidarity. GA Report A/HRC/26/34 fn 38 supra Mr Craig Mokhiber 
(an OHCR official) stressed that “international solidarity is a crucial principle in addressing current global issues 
and tragedies” GA Consultation Report Insert fn p. 3  
41 Id., 
42 Ross and Prebil, fn 10 supra p. 36  
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If solidarity as a principle can direct other core values and legal institutions, it underlines the 
importance of including morality within the Court’s balancing act. This balancing takes both 
the ex ante existence (through the principle of conferral and sincere cooperation) of solidarity 
as well as an ex post application (through a reinforced proportionality test with an added layer 
of morality), into account. This latter element is the solidarity test, which incorporates but 
does not undermine the other legal principles as such. Solidarity as a principle is therefore a 
different tool for conflict resolution, serving both as a reminder and taking both temporal 
claims into account. It does so by adding a morality claim to the balancing of the Court.  
 
More than just an unenforceable grundnorm, solidarity thus conceived enables a holistic 
interpretation and gives meaning to why there is a common legal order.43 As Steven L. Winter 
explains, “[n]atural law theory claims that morality is a constitutive precondition of legality 
and, thus, a necessary component of all (proper) acts of law identification and law 
application”.44  
1.1.2 Progressive Change Through Extended Interpretation  
If we consider that solidarity encompasses a standard of morality within European Uion law, 
the introduction of morally informed judgments within the Court’s reasoning may become a 
possibility or more accurately, a necessity. It is within this vein that Public International Law 
may shed light on questions with respect to what solidarity as a legal principle should actually 
entail and on the way in which solidarity might be interpreted as a moral obligation.45  The 
UN Commission on Human Rights’ work on the proposed draft declaration for a legal 
principle of solidarity may enlighten us in the process.46 Their proposed draft declaration on a 
legal principle of solidarity underlines that it does not intend “to create new norms and 
obligations, but to signify existing obligations with a view to fostering implementation and 
accountability with regard to the fulfilment of human rights”.47  
                                                
43 For more detailed discussion of the place of proportionality within the legal order, see section 4.2 infra 
44 Steven L Winter A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (Chicago University of Chicago Press 2001). 
p. 199 (“Winter Fog”)   
45 Cf. United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council 26th Sess. Report of the Independent Expert on 
human rights and international solidarity A/HRC/26/34, 1 April 2014 (and Addendum I) (“GA Report 
A/HRC/26/34”) point 29. Available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Pages/ListReports.aspx. (Last visit 4 July 
2017.)  
46 GA Report A/HRC/26/34 fn 38 supra. 
47 GA/71/280 fn 26 point 9 pp 5/20-6-20. 
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The Expert’s Report, issued prior to the UN draft declaration, noted the importance of an 
affirmative declaration on solidarity such that it not be viewed as a short-term emergency 
measure but rather as a full-fledged human right to be claimed not exclusively ex post.  
 
As the Report on the Draft Declaration outlines, “… preventive solidarity and reactive 
solidarity [are] two sides of the same coin… the true value of international solidarity lies in 
the processes that inform collective objectives and acts of preventive solidarity and in their 
potential outcomes in the long-term”.48 This long-term view, and the concept of “preventative 
solidarity” is worthy of notice as many actions taken in the name of solidarity have been 
directed towards disaster relief and ex post application: 
 
Preventive solidarity is the substantive component of international solidarity relating to the human rights 
standards and obligations that must inform collective agreements and initiatives. International cooperation is 
the operational component, through which preventive solidarity agreements and initiatives are implemented. 
As such, international solidarity is actualized only through the confluence of both preventive solidarity and 
international cooperation.49 
 
International cooperation is the operational component, whereas the joint actions agreed upon 
require sincere cooperation. A second strand posits that the principle should be seen as a 
broader, more inclusive form of cooperation aimed at a specific goal. This cooperation entails 
respect for existing Treaty obligations.  
 
The Report on the Draft Declaration also asserts that 
[…] it is possible for standards of morality to enter the domain of international law and politics, thereby 
allowing for progressive change through extended interpretations as well as for amendments of international 
norms and rules. The aim is not to revolutionise existing international law, but to introduce elements of 
morally informed judgement in the application or development of the rules of international law. While this 
solidarist doctrine of natural law is confronted with the argument that law cannot be based on something as 
disputable as morality and reason, an argument in its favour is that the validity of legal argument is based 
not on the nature of its origins, but on how it is received by the international community upon its 
introduction. Therefore, principles derived from reason and morality may be translated into standard 
operating procedures, State practice and, ultimately, rules of positive international law and thus possibly 
gain international recognition that cannot be acquired otherwise.50 
                                                
48 Point 24 A/70/316 Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Independent Expert on human 
rights and international solidarity 12 August 2015 point1 p 4/20 (“A/70/316”) Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/70/documentslist.shtml (last visit 8 July 2017) p. 11  
49 Point 54 A/70/316 fn 48 supra p. 19/20 
50 GA/71/280 fn 26 supra point 29 p. 12/20 (citing Tonny Brems Knudsen, International Society and 
International Solidarity:Recapturing the Solidarist Origins of the English School Paper presented at workshop 
International Relations in Europe: Concepts, Schools and Institutions, 28th Joint Sessions of Workshops of the 
European Consortium for Political Research, 14-19 April 2000, Copenhagen, Denmark,  (“Knudsen”) p. 16 
available at https://ecpr.eu/Events/PaperDetails.aspx?PaperID=15134&EventID=46 (last accessed 21 February 
2017). The specific point, also reiterated in the report’s conclusions states that this supports the “reaffirmation 
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The Report of the Independent Expert thus concludes that: 
… the right to international solidarity is a claimable right, both feasible and enforceable. It is not surprising 
why some degree of scepticism persists in the light of certain factors that affect not only the proposed right 
to international solidarity, but also others known as “collective rights”. For example, there may be no 
reliable and available means for enforcing compliance with the obligations generated by the right to 
international solidarity. In some cases, the courts may be unwilling or unable to adjudicate on that right.51   
 
A serious search for an understanding and practical manifestation of this principle is clearly 
demonstrated by the construction of, and the debate on, the proposed Draft Declaration.52 
Article 6 of the Draft Declaration enumerates the holders of the right to international 
solidarity and, in Article 7 lays out what that right includes. There it seems, the right to 
international solidarity entails a respect for the international obligations. Thus, a right to 
international solidarity cannot be achieved without a corresponding duty to respect 
international obligations or agreed joint actions. Similarly, Article 8 identifies the principle’s 
duty bearers, laying out their responsibilities in broad terms, while Articles 9 and 12 set out 
more specific obligations. The Independent Expert53 reiterates that the obligations of States 
(the primary duty bearers) spelled out in the proposed draft declaration, are pre-existing under 
the various international human right treaties to which they have acceded.  
 
The Draft Declaration then provides an important value by articulating just how such 
obligations are to be applied or implemented in accordance with the requirements of the 
specific provisions of those human rights treaties, as set out in the corresponding general 
comments and general recommendations of the treaty bodies. In that context, the right to 
international solidarity is a right to demand the implementation of international solidarity 
understood as an obligation to participate so that actual benefits can be derived from it.54 The 
problem is not merely to describe what solidarity means, or whether solidarity can be seen as 
a legal principle. More importantly it is to understand that solidarity exists prior to, and is then 
applied ex post to the unilateral actions of the European Union Member States. Importantly, 
the duality exists in both of these principles in indirectly asserting and entailing a duty not to 
undermine one another other.  
                                                                                                                                                   
that the principle of international solidarity meets the requirements of a legal standard and can thus become a 
right when the community of States so decides”, my italics  
51 A/70/316 fn 48 supra point 50 p. 19/20  
52 GA Report A/HRC/26/34 fn 38 supra 
53 The Independent Expert referred to is Virginia Dandan. More information on Dandan’s mandate and works 
may be found at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Solidarity/Pages/IESolidarityIndex.aspx (last accessed 12 
March 2017) 
54 Point 25 of GA/71/280 fn 26 supra p 10/20. 
  
 
22 
The principle of solidarity is subtle and is perhaps necessary as a form of background 
coercion to remind us of the commitments that follow on initial intentions.55 The most 
pressing and acute legal problem remains to provide an understanding of solidarity as a 
response to current challenges, that is how solidarity as a principle adds another layer of 
obligation to act into a reading of the law. The problem with adjudication of the right or 
obligation of solidarity thus lies in the non-existence of a definition bridging its ex ante 
existence with its ex post application. It is perhaps this higher order which may provide some 
explanation for, and purpose of, an emergent principle of solidarity in both legal realms. In 
other words, the application of solidarity ex ante (proactive) and ex post (reactive): 
International cooperation, be it loyal or sincere, is the operational component through the 
decisions nation States are willing to make.  
1.2 Searching for Solidarity as Joint Action  
Although the sceptical view may offer a framework to inquire into why solidarity cannot be 
seen as more than “an elusive political statement”56 or a normative claim, the impossibility of 
perceiving solidarity as a legal principle that this presupposes hinders a deeper understanding 
of the requirements of current legal dynamics. As will be discussed below, if solidarity is 
perceived as joint action, the philosophical as well as the legal interpretation must meld to 
create a coherent whole incorporating not only what solidarity could be but what solidarity as 
a legal principle actually does.  Is solidarity then a joint action? Applying Sangiovanni´s 
typology to the solidarity required between Member States provides a unique insight to the 
functioning of the concept itself. 57 For the Member States to share various aims requires that 
the “specification of the goal includes a reference to the actions and aims” of each Member 
State.58 Sangiovanni applies the principle in terms of goals instead of intentions, “acting in 
solidarity with others does not require – though it does not exclude – sharing an intention that 
we do something together. We can in solidarity with others even if our joint actions are not 
unified by an overarching, shared agency”.59  
 
                                                
55 Sangiovanni fn 1 supra talks about background coercion at p. 346 
56 Küçük fn 12 supra 
57 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 342  
58 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 343. 
59 Ibid. p. 343 
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1.2.1 A Legal Translation of the Theory of Solidarity as Joint Action  
Nevertheless, the classification of agreed joint actions may change over time as do social 
conceptions of what we define as the common good, (a term capable itself of misuse).60 It is 
also possible that joint action is not specifically a definitional construct, but rather an evolving 
concept depending on circumstances and future needs, or a reminder of why cooperation and 
joint action was intended in the first place. When applied to the legal sphere, an understanding 
of the ex ante existence and ex post application of a legal principle of solidarity in European 
Union law are necessary. To better understand the construction of the principle, the following 
elements (as rephrased in §1.1 supra), for the purposes of this thesis as the following:  
 
1. [Member States] share a goal to overcome some significant adversity;  
2. [Member States] individually intend to do their part in achieving the shared goal in ways that mesh;  
3. [Member States] are individually committed (a) to the realisation of the shared goal and (b) to not 
bypass each other´s will in the achievement of the goal;  
4. [Member States] are disposed (a) to incur significant costs to realise their goal; and (b) to share one 
another´s fates in ways relevant to the shared goal.  
 
Facts 1.-4. Need not be common knowledge.61 
 
The first element might, for example, be the “adversity” entailed in overcoming climate 
change by the promotion of renewable energies. In that case, Member States intend to 
undertake individual and common efforts in a manner that do not undermine the objective or 
achievement of the goal. In addition, by agreeing to being part of a larger whole, Member 
States also share their fate – that is, one unilateral action that goes strictly against or severly 
undermines the objective will harm the objective set forth. In this sense, solidarity is an 
inherent part of joint action.  
The fact that Member states share a goal has a close relationship to the principle of conferral 
where competences are conferred in order to achieve objectives that each and every one have 
in common. The principle of conferral could therefore be seen as a direct legal translation of a 
common intention or joint action. The principle of conferral in legal terms represents both the 
will to overcome a significant adversity together within a Union, be it an exclusive, shared or 
partial competence, as well as the limits thereof. That is, by setting boundaries to the 
competences there is also a possibility for the Member States to choose their own individual 
solution to common issues where European Union competences do not reach or where they 
are shared.  
                                                
60 On this point, see Peter Häberle who argues that the public common good is Wandlungsfähig – Öffentliches 
Interesse als juristisches Problem (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2. Auflage 2006) 
61 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra, at p. 343 
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In this manner, the principle of conferral and the principle of sincere cooperation, acting 
together, provide a conceptual framework that can enable a principle of solidarity to function 
as intended. The principle of sincere cooperation or loyalty is therefore closely related to the 
claim that “Member States are individually committed (a) to the realisation of the shared goal 
and (b) to not bypass each other´s will in the achievement of the goal”. The conferral of 
competences may then be seen as an expression of solidarity that explains why common 
challenges should be met by common actions.62 Those two elements are therefore foundations 
of an ex ante function of the principle of solidarity, whereas point (2) and (4) operate at a later 
stage where the effects of the unilateral measures have proven to undermine a common or 
joint achievement of the goal.  
In this sense, it is important to underline that these competences must have been conferred on 
the European Union at least in part, in order to make this claim effective. A lack of 
competence would make such a statement void and there would be no legal grounds to argue 
in favour of a joint action in the name of solidarity.  
 
The final arbiter of what has been conferred and whether an action has been taken in 
solidarity is the European Court of Justice, whose role, in effect, is to define whether or not 
the individual sub plans of the various Member States have meshed. The fourth element 
seems to be more difficult to translate into a legal principle, but it should be understood as 
something more than a negative, pacta sunt servanda or positive good faith action, which 
would, ideally, penetrate solidarity’s entire temporal range of operation. It seems, then, that 
these four different elements operate as a foundation, as an encompassing whole, and, as a 
verification mechanism.  
 
The principle of solidarity thus encompasses all these elements, ex ante and ex post. As a note 
for further discussion, it is probably timely to ask whether the joint actions and competences 
that have been conferred are sufficient to face the contemporary challenges faced by the 
European Union today. Accordingly, some of the most recent case law of European Union 
courts may now be read utilising a different perspective.  
 
                                                
62 Pernice, fn 14 supra p. 43. 
Diese Europäische Solidarität gründet sich aus das Eigeninteresse jedes Einselnen, die gemeinsamen Herausforderungen 
durch eine gemeinsame Politik durch die gemeinsamen Institutionen und Verfahren der Europäische Union zu meistern.  
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The verification or direct application of a principle of solidarity, nevertheless, may be 
understood as a justification of various unilateral measures that mesh with the overall 
common objective as enshrined in the treaties. Translated into Sangiovanni´s terms in their ex 
post application, they are proportionate to the aim of introducing sub plans that mesh required 
to tackle significant adversity which are intended to be overcome by the Member States.  
 
1.2.2 A Duty that is Not Coerced yet Open to Coercion 
Solidarity as a legal principle, is a Janus-faced principle inasmuch as it is a duty that is not 
coerced ex ante, yet it remains open to coercion ex post, through a reinforced principle of 
proportionality (corresponding to the principle of conferral as well as to the principle of 
sincere cooperation). Thus, an understanding of solidarity as joint action cannot be complete 
without an understanding of sub plans that mesh. The individual actions of the Member States 
towards the joint action are characterised as sub plans. If a joint action could be deemed to be 
environmental protection, the various national sub plans must be capable of meeting this 
objective and not undermine it. That is, an individual unilateral sub plan should not be 
contrary to the shared goal. According to Sangiovanni, such action directed at common goals 
requires both reciprocal commitment and meshing: 
 
When I coerce you to adopt subplans that mesh with mine, I do not achieve the intended mesh via your 
reciprocal commitment to the shared goal; I rather bypass it entirely.... Such coercion might be justified, 
and it might even be justified because you have an (enforceable) obligation to participate (on which 
more below), but as long as you do not commit yourself and I need to coerce your participation, I 
cannot be said to act in solidarity with you.63  
 
The key is that the coercion here is designed to “get us to do what we are already committed 
to doing; its primary aim is not to bypass the other´s commitment but to reinforce it”.64 But 
what type of obligations does solidarity entail?  
Solidarity can be defined as a principle of duty that is not coerced, yet open to coercion. The 
view of solidarity as a coherent whole cannot be attained without the existence of a 
corresponding duty not to undermine it. This is similar to a situation where several nations 
face flooding from a rising ocean and build dykes which do not connect due to purely internal 
concerns. Nevertheless, an idea of solidarity as mentioned below does not need to be a forced, 
unified action.  
                                                
63 Sangiovani Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 346. This element will be further analysed infra.  
64 Idem, p. 345 
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[…] we can still count as acting in solidarity despite our having very different ideas about what is 
required to achieve our shared goal. If, on the other hand, we have completely non-overlapping ideas 
about what would count as overcoming racial injustice and oppression, then we cannot act in solidarity 
because we cannot be said to share a goal in the relevant sense […] to be acting in solidarity, we need to 
form an intention that our subplans mesh. Subplans mesh just in case there is a way for each participant 
to satisfy their subplans that is compatible with achievement of the shared goal. It is important to 
emphasise that for our subplans to mesh, however, they need not mesh all the way down. If, for 
example, we realise that your pursuing [a policy] and my pursuing a legislative agenda will end up 
somehow making [the situation] worse than if we only did one but not the other, then, insofar as we are 
acting in solidarity, we ought to coordinate our actions to prevent this from happening. But we can still 
act in solidarity if we each pursue our course of action despite our knowledge that we would do even 
better by uniting forces. 65  
 
As noted above, many attempts have already been made to describe the nature and action of 
the principle of solidarity from a normative and from a legal perspective. Under a more 
holistic reading, sub plans may be described as follows: Sub plans here, are interpreted as 
actions translated into individual measures, the decision of the nature of legal remedies, or 
acts, at the national or regional level within the area covered by shared policy objectives 
enshrined in the Treaties. It also means that the goal or joint action should be shared in the 
relevant sense. In the guise of sub plans that mesh, a legal principle of solidarity therefore, has 
an intrinsic link to the principle of proportionality.   
The following attempts to explain how and why that may be the case when the principle is 
addressed to an objective such as renewable energy promotion. There is a duty within the 
concept of solidarity for actors not to undermine each other. According to Sangiovanni, this 
action need not be coerced since the parties and may not coerce others to adopt individual 
subplans that mesh but coercion may be necessary where obligations are enforceable.66 That 
is, if Member States decide to cooperate, their actions should serve the agreed-upon objective. 
Nevertheless, they can serve the agreed-upon objective in a variety of ways. The cooperation 
can be voluntary when possible and mandatory when needed and where so agreed.  
2 From Ex Ante Existence towards Ex Post Application of Solidarity  
The mandatory requirements do not imply a great deal of discretion as to the nature of the 
individual sub plans. When, then, must a measure of coercion reinforce the parties’ 
obligations to do what they are primarily committed to without bypassing the operation of 
others’ commitments? 67 It could perhaps be understood that such coercion is necessary when 
                                                
65 Hauke Brunkhorst, “Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Constitutional Evolution and Europe”, in Laitinen & Pessi 
fn 37 supra pp. 178-238; Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity. From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community 
Jeffrey Flynn Trans (Cambridge Mass, The MIT Press, 2005) (“Brunkhorst Civic Friendship”). 
66 Sangiovani Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 346. This element will be further analysed infra. 
67 Idem, 
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the shared goal suffers from discrepancies due to changed intentions or unilateral actions that 
undermine the goal.  
Once a Treaty is signed or a joint action is agreed upon by the parties, there is an indirect 
application of an ex ante coercive element of the principle of solidarity. Applied ex ante, this 
principle has coercive power to the extent that common objectives have been agreed upon and 
should not be infringed. This variant of the principle of solidarity operates subtly as a form of 
background coercion reminding us of the commitments following onto the initial intentions.68  
Solidarity as a legal principle, remains a dual principle inasmuch as it is a duty that is not 
formally coerced ex ante, yet it remains open to coercion ex post, through a reinforced 
principle of proportionality responsive to the principle of conferral as well as to the principle 
of sincere cooperation. Importantly, both of these principles indirectly assert and entail a duty 
not to undermine each other. From this theoretical point of departure, we now turn towards a 
more detailed explanation of the ex ante existence and the ex post application of solidarity as 
a legal principle in European Union law. The theory Sangiovanni proposes informs our 
definition of the ex ante and ex post aspects of the legal principle of solidarity and mirrors the 
respect for the obligations within the Treaties and the consequences of such actions.  
Bieber points to the provisions relevant to the solidarity existing between the Member States 
and among the Union, and the Member States as such. It is the latter form of solidarity that 
takes the most problematic form.69 Nevertheless, recent developments demonstrate a need for 
a different and more nuanced understanding of the principle of solidarity. That would consist 
of a principle that functions as an overarching legal and normative contract and moral duty. 
This means going beyond a utilitarian approach where advantage and obligations are scored 
for each single case. A normative approach should favour a holistic understanding of the 
essence and meaning of being part of a whole – that the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts. 
                                                
68 Sangiovanni talks about background coercion at fn 1 supra p. 346 
69 Bieber fn  3 supra asserts: 
Eine ganz anders gelagerte Form der Solidarität im Rahmen der Union betrifft die Ausgestaltung der Beziehungen der 
Mitgliedstaaten untereinander und zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und der Union. Solidarität wird insoweit vielfach als 
Masstab für das Handeln der Union und/oder der Mitgliedstaaten festgelegt. Beispiele der ausdrucklicklichen 
Erwähnung in den Vertragen bilden die Art. 21  
Abs. 1 EUV (Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik), Art. 80 AEUV (Immigration, Asyl, Kontrolle der 
Aussengrenzen); die „Solidaritatsklauseln “der Arti. 122 Abs. 1 AEUV und 222 AEUV (Hilfe bei 
Versorgungsproblemen und bei Terroranschlagen) sowie Arti. 194 Abs. 1 AEUV (Energiepolitik). Zur Bezeichnung 
dieserzwischenstaatlichen Solidarität verwenden dieVertrage eine nahezu stereotype Begrifflichkeit (u.a. Art. 122 Abs. 
1 AEUV; „im Geiste der Solidarität zwischen Mitgliedstaaten“). (at pp. 72-73.) 
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2.1 The Ex Ante Existence of the Principle of Solidarity in European Union Law  
The general structure of the argumentation here sets out with an explanation of the ex ante 
existence of solidarity, followed by the relevant principles of European Union law, an 
elaboration of case law and finally an attempt at bridging the theoretical and legal reflections. 
There is a clear connection between the principle of solidarity and the principle of loyalty as 
“one of the most evident expressions of the Member States’ commitment to solidarity”70 as 
well as an expression of sincere cooperation which: 
 corresponds with solidarity in cases where the Member States are to fulfil their obligations arising from EU 
law, despite the fact that it is against their national interests… In these cases, the Member States have to 
allow the collective interest of the EU to prevail over their individual interests, and thereby show solidarity 
with other Member States”.71  
 
According to Sangiovanni, a disposition for joining together in solidarity, or sharing one 
another´s fate, are two necessary conditions which can be both motivated and unmotivated, 
but the actual function of solidarity is as collective action.72 The principle of solidarity exists 
where a coherent commitment needs to be reinforced, or where there is a need to embrace a 
principle capable of reminding the parties of their commitments and obligations based on the 
intentions pursued. As noted above, these developments may lead us to areas with their own 
interpretive perils, but one thing is rapidly becoming clear, the principle of solidarity is 
permanently enshrined and intertwined with other fundamental treaty objectives.73 This 
engagement may not be overtly referenced, nor described in exhaustive, or explicit terms by 
the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, it exists as a grounding rule of a legal game 
where other principles fail. As Küçük argues:  
The omnipresence of solidarity in the EU legal order makes it difficult to develop a consistent and generally 
applicable definition of the concept, which paradoxically, makes it even more important to develop a sound 
understanding of its meaning.74  
 
                                                
70 Küçük fn 12 supra p. 974 (referring to Ross, fn 21 supra ‘p. 42 and Koen Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel Eds. 
European Union Law (London Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 14 and Marcus Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in 
EU Law, (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 40, drawing distinctions between the principles of loyalty and 
solidarity.) 
71 Küçük  fn 12 supra p. 974 (note omitted, referring to Bruno de Witte, ”Institutional Principles: A Special 
Category of General Principles of EC Law’, in General Principles of European Community Law Ulf Bernitz and 
Joakum Nergelius Eds (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 153 (“Bernitz and Nergelius 
General Principals”) and John Temple Lang, “Article 10 EC-  The Most Important ‘General Principle’ of 
Community Law” in General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, Ulf Bernitz, Joakum Nergelius 
and Cecilia Cardner in association with Xavier Groussot Eds (Kluwer Law International 2008) p. 75, and Joined 
Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v France, 10 December 1969 ECLI:EU:C:1969:68 (“Cases 6/16 and 11/69 
Commission v France”.) 
72 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 348 
73 See Wellens fn 3 supra 
74 Küçük fn 12  supra p 967  
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The main point demonstrating the duality of solidarity in this thesis, is found in the European 
Union´s renewable energy policy, an area particularly associated with the concept.75 If joint 
action is the primary characteristic of solidarity within European Union law, the conferral of 
competences is another expression of solidarity explaining why common challenges should be 
met by common actions.76  
 
It has been argued that “[s]olidarity operates as a principle to achieve common goals; 
sometimes it imposes common but differentiated obligations and responsibilities; it 
encompasses procedural, operational, substantive and normative elements as well as values 
and legal obligations”.77 Thus, the principle of solidarity may be seen as a necessary 
precondition for the principle of conferral, a positive obligation to achieve common 
objectives. Obligations remind duty bearers of their mandate to fulfil their respective 
intentions.78  
 
The importance of understanding why solidarity as a legal principle may be an adequate tool 
to address issues of international cooperation lies in its potential to create a more coherent 
legal line of argumentation going beyond the conventional view of “sincere cooperation” as 
just another negative obligation not to harm. Sincere cooperation as a positive moral 
requirement supplements solidarity as a negative obligation.  
 
Sincere cooperation entails more than just a negative obligation not to undermine the 
objectives and intentions leading up to a moral commitment.79 The principle of sincere 
cooperation and the principle of conferral may operate together to act as guides towards an ex 
ante understanding of solidarity as a positive obligation.  
                                                
75 Küçük fn 12 supra. 972 where she states: 
In the constitutional order of the EU, energy solidarity, however, is not limited to emergencies. It is central to the 
achievement of the Union´s objectives in the area of energy. These objectives – are defines under Article 194 TFEU. 
The provision requires the Union to attain these objectives ’in a spirit of solidarity between Member States’. The 
wording of the provision asserts that it is not devised to impose a clear solidarity obligation. 
76 Pernice, fn 14 supra p. 43. 
Diese Europäische Solidarität gründet sich aus das Eigeninteresse jedes Einselnen, die gemeinsamen Herausforderungen 
durch eine gemeinsame Politik durch die gemeinsamen Institutionen und Verfahren der Europäische Union zu meistern.  
77 Kotzur and Schalenback fn. 35 supra p. 72 referring to R Wolfrum, “Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging 
Structural Principle of Public International Law,” in Dupuy (ed.), volkerrecht als Weltording. Festschrift fur 
Christian Tomuschat, 2006, pp. 1087 and Wellens, fn 3 supra, pp. 3 at 13 p. 72 
78 Cf. GA Report A/HRC/26/34 fn. 38 supra   
79 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra and Ronald St. John MacDonald, “The International Community as a 
Legal Community”, in Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, 
Ronald St. John MacDonald and Douglas M. Johnston Eds (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 
(“MacDonald”) 
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Whereas the principle of conferral can be seen as a necessary condition, an “engine” of 
solidarity, the principle of sincere cooperation provides its fuel, reinforcing or securing the 
abstention from harming the objective. Nevertheless, a principle of solidarity is needed to 
underline the positive obligation of cooperation. If the very first Article of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) stipulates that “[t]he Member States confer competences to attain 
objectives they have in common”, those objectives must, prima facie, be directly connected to 
the principle of sincere cooperation of Article 4 (3) TEU, where “Member States are, inter 
alia, to refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives”.  
2.1.1 The Principle of Sincere Cooperation in Light of Solidarity as Joint Action 
The ex ante operation of the principle of solidarity is a necessary tool and guide, for and to, an 
interpretation of the principle. The more limited view of the principle of solidarity has been 
focused on a reinforcement for the principle of loyal or sincere cooperation as opposed to a 
standalone obligation. Accordingly, “… solidarity and loyalty are of (and stem from) the 
same spirit as found in Article 24 (3) TEU which refers to a ’spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity’”.80 But why is solidarity distinguishable from the principle of loyalty?  
 
… solidarity is a principle of Union law, and its design once again portrays the Union as being distinct from 
an international organisation on the one hand and a federal state on the other. Although solidarity among 
Member States has not been the basis for much judicial activism, it has served to reinforce important legal 
concepts: the community of law and the principle of loyal co-operation.81  
 
If the principle of loyalty is perceived in that manner, there is little to distinguish it from the 
principle of solidarity. That is, solidarity in its simplest form entails that “the parties of a 
relationship are expected not to pursue their short-term self interests if it means jeopardising 
the common good”.82 We see here, Küçük’s line of argumentation in the course of her 
reference to the codification of the loyalty principle into Article 4(3) TEU’s principle of 
sincere cooperation:  
As a requirement of the loyalty principle, the Member States are to fulfil their responsibilities under EU law 
either by taking appropriate measures or by refraining from adopting measures that may jeopardise the 
attainment of the Union´s objectives. In accordance with the Court´s jurisprudence, the duty of loyalty was 
later codified to reflect the mutuality of the relationship between the Union and the Member States and 
rephrased as “the principle of sincere cooperation” under Article 4(3) TEU.83  
                                                
80 Kotzur and Schmalenbach fn 35 supra p. 73 referring to E. Regelsberger/ D. Kugelmann, in Strenz (ed.), 
EUV/AEUV, 2nd ed. 2012, Art 24 TEU para 8,9 an dunderling that “It is this very interdependence of solidarity 
and loyalty that makes the Union a solidagemeinschaft“. See Peter Häberle and Markus Kotzur Europäische 
Verfassungslehre 7th ed. (Zurich Nomos 2011), p. 709 
81 Bogdandy Founding Principals fn 3 supra p. 53(citing cases)  
82 Küçük fn 12 supra p. 973 
83 Küçük fn 12 supra p 973. (Citing Bruno de Witte,” Institutional Principles: A Special Category of General 
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In analysing the case law, Küçük further suggests in her interpretation of the case law up 
through 2009 that the Court doesn’t require the weak to help the strong but rather solidarity is 
aimed at maintaining market stability. 84 
2.1.2 The Principle of Conferral in Light of Solidarity as Joint Action 
The concept of solidarity as a principle, dependent upon on a principle of conferral may 
redefine and reshape each of them in an interdependent manner. A reading of the first article 
of the Treaty on the European Union in this light thus gains another meaning. 
Article 1 of the TEU proclaims that “[t]he Member States confer competences to attain 
objectives they have in common”. These coinciding interests are then legally translated into 
the principle of conferral, that is, an agreement amongst Member states to better do together, 
what cannot be achieved alone. Therefore, the principle of conferral is not made without 
reason or “willkürlich hochgezont” but rather is a pragmatic step to delineate the areas where 
a common action is needed in order to reach a specific goal.85 A first important point is that 
the concept of solidarity “excludes the possibility of acting in solidarity with those with whom 
you do not share a goal”.86  
Thus, although the stepping-stones towards the goal may differ, the goal presupposes within 
its definition, an actual meaning of a “collectivity”, in which Member States collectively 
decided when and how to cooperate within this realm and even to confer competences to the 
Union level to achieve “objectives they have in common”.87 The following provides an 
elaboration of the point in the case law and attempts to understand the relationship between 
the principle of conferral and the principle of sincere cooperation in light of a principle of 
solidarity.  
These three elements are instrumental to the ex ante existence of the principle of solidarity as 
such, and are not to be seen as independent, free-standing individual principles but rather, as a 
coherent whole. The existence of solidarity within European Union law can be traced back to 
the days of the European Coal and Steel Community.88 The first reference to solidarity within 
the case law came from Advocate General Lagrange in 1959.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Principles of EC Law”, in Bernitz and Nergelius General Principals fn 71 supra p. 153  
84 Küçük fn 12 supra p. 979 (and the cases cited in the footnotes.) 
85 Pernice fn 14 supra p. 40 
86 Sangiovanni, Joint Action, fn 1 supra p. 344. 
87 Article 1 TEU  
88 Küçük fn 12 supra describes some of the ECSC cases at pp 977-979 of which some of the cases are referred to 
in this thesis 
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AG Lagrange extended his 1961 discussion of solidarity subsequently in Pont-à-Mousson v 
Haute Autorité,89 arguing that the relief demanded by the appellant steel companies was 
“incompatible with the principle of solidarity which underlies the Community”.90 From this, 
we may infer that solidarity as a notion began with two elements; its comprehensive 
application, as well as its underlying and foundational nature. The first actual judgment based 
upon the principle was Commission v France, issued eight years later, emphasising the notion 
of solidarity´s relationship to Community Obligations when Italy set up its own system for 
dealing with milk and meat surpluses which interfered with EEC Regulations.91 In the first 
cases with Member States as parties (as opposed to those involving the interaction of 
undertakings with the High Authority), the Court took a concept it had previously applied to 
undertakings and formulated an application to Member State relations. In Commission v 
France, the Court, for the first time, connected the principle to Article 5 EEC92 thereby 
creating an interpretation of solidarity in the form of a sovereign state obligation. It is 
interesting to note the implications of this since, that article is imperative with respect to the 
adaption of unilateral measures that might endanger the objectives of the Treaty. Solidarity, 
when linked to Article 5 EEC was now, no longer a political notion, but a legal imperative in 
its own right.  
2.2 Solidarity as an Obligation Open to Coercion  
It is important to appreciate the European Court of Justice’s initial problem in setting out 
the principle’s parameters in the first cases under the ECSC and the EEC. The 
significance of the problem lies in the fact that the Court was formulating an 
interpretation for the first time. In giving normative form to the concept, the Court took 
the path of reserving to itself the right to interpret or reinterpret its meaning. Instead of 
defining solidarity in firm, substantive, legal terms from the outset, the Court has, in its 
reasoning as to whether or not the action fit within the principle, presented us with a less 
coherent interpretative lens under which to examine it.  
The Court’s approach leaves us with little guidance, a lack of clarity and a lack of legal 
certainty as to what, precisely solidarity is. It leaves few clues as to whether solidarity 
                                                
89 Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange delivered on 19 October 1959 in Case 14/59 Société des fonderies de 
Pont-à-Mousson v High Authority [1959] ECR 215, 244 (Citing Article 3 ECSC) (“Case 14/59 Opinion”) p. 244 
90 Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange delivered on 7 June 1961 in Joined cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 26 and 
27/60 and 1/61 Meroni & Co. and others v High Authority [1961] Eng Spec Ed 161, 176 (“Meroni Opinion”) p. 
176 
91 An extensive overview of the early cases is found in Küçük fn 12 The case represents a situation where a 
member state infringed a Commission Decision by maintaining a preferential rediscount rate for exports in 
violation of its obligation under Article 5 ECSC to facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims  
92 Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v France fn 71 supra paras 16- 17  
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can stand alone as a principle as such, or whether it is bound to specific joint actions.  
One tentative explanation of the principle is that solidarity is a concept and a principle 
that goes beyond a mere interest or balancing of Member States decisions to enact 
unilateral legal measures that will undermine a common objective. Solidarity therefore 
remains a principle of duty that is not coerced yet remains open to coercion. That it is not 
coerced is based on the ex ante existence within the Treaties themselves of a principle of 
solidarity that is constructed from both the principle of conferral and the principle of 
sincere cooperation. 
2.2.1 To Profit from the Advantages of the Community  
As next we see, solidarity was developed further into a legal imperative in the course of 
Member State implementations of secondary legislation and the interpretations of their acts by 
the Court. The concept of solidarity within European Communities, it should be recalled, was 
first enunciated years earlier in 1959 in an Opinion by Advocate General Maurice Lagrange in 
an ECSC case concerning the steel industry, where he opined:  
The Court has frequently had occasion to rule that the equalization scheme is based primarily on the 
solidarity of all consumers …which implies that its general application must be as comprehensive as 
possible. There seems to me to be no ground justifying the existence of a legal obligation on the part of the 
High Authority to grant an exception in this case which the Court has to adjudicate, however special the 
facts may be in certain respects.93   
 
In a subequent Opinion (in another case under the ECSC), AG Lagrange summarily dismissed 
a claim for “special damages” under Article 40 ECSC asserted by an undertaking because it 
had allegedly been disproportionally harmed by the High Authorities’ administration of an 
equalization scheme, stating: “[i]n the first place it is incompatible with the principle of 
solidarity which underlies the Community”.94 In the first case where the Court discussed the 
concept in relation to a Commission infringement action under Article 169 EEC Commission 
v Italy it held: 
24. In permitting Member States to profit from the advantages of the Community, the Treaty imposes on 
them also the obligation to respect its rules. For a State unilaterally to break, according to its own 
conception of national interest, the equilibrium between advantages and obligations flowing from its 
adherence to the Community brings into question the equality of Member States before Community law and 
creates discriminations at the expense of their nationals, and above all of the nationals of the State itself 
which places itself outside the Community rules.  
25. This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the 
Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community legal order.  
It appears therefore that, in deliberately refusing to give effect on its territory to one of the systems provided 
for by Regulations Nos 1975/69 and 2195/69, the Italian Republic has failed in a conspicuous manner to 
fulfil the obligations which it has assumed by virtue of its adherence to the European Economic 
Community.95 
 
                                                
93 Case 14/59 Opinion fn 89 supra (Citing Article 3 ECSC.) 
94 Meroni Opinion fn 90 supra p 176, here there is a direct connection between proportionality and solidarity 
95 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy 7 February 1973 [1973] ECR 101 paras 24-25. 
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Here, it appears that the principle of solidarity was seen here as a negative obligation, i.e. not 
to interfere (abstain from harming). Paragraph 24 also mirrors the positive obligation to 
respect the rules imposed by the Treaties under Article 5 (1) EEC96, as noted by Küçük:  
[Solidarity] was initially formulated under Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community and later under Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and was 
designed to ensure the compliance of the Member States with their obligations arising from the Treaties and 
facilitate the achievement of Union tasks. As a requirement of the loyalty principle, the Member States are 
to fulfil their responsibilities under EU law either by taking appropriate measures or by refraining from 
adopting measures that may jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives.97  
 
That is, in this case, the duty of solidarity was seen as having both positive as well as negative 
aspects and as crucial to the Community legal order. Nobody should be able to take advantage 
of those who are complying with the rules.  Further, the coercive arm of the Community, now 
included the coercive aspect of solidarity. This view is particularly noticeable in Commission 
v. Italy where the Court directly refers to Article 169 EEC of the Treaty of Rome.98 AG 
Mayras, in his Commission v Italy Opinion, refers to Article 169 EEC as the mechanism for 
enforcing community interests in the face of inertia or resistance by the Member States.99 The 
gist of this definition of solidarity and its starting point is found in AG Mayras’ Commission v 
Italy Opinion:  
[The Member State’s] failure to act falls within the ambit of Article 169 of the Treaty, the aim of which is to 
ensure that Community interests prevail in face of the inertia or resistance of the Member States. To decide 
otherwise would be to disregard the very foundations and aims of the Community, which cannot be attained, 
as you have held in your judgments, unless the rule the rules laid down by its institutions are applied 
automatically at the same moment and with identical effects throughout the length and breadth of the 
Common Market.100  
 
This, then, is the foundation upon which the Court´s jurisprudence on the principle of 
solidarity was laid. It might also be thought that solidarity as such meant that “the market 
actors had to give up their short-term interest for the sake of the common good”.101 
Nevertheless, it is in the guise of a foundational concept of the Community, equally a 
Member state duty, a solidarity obligation, that the Court procedes to develop, into the main 
element of the solidarity principle in its future jurisprudence.  
                                                
96 Küçük fn 12 supra p 974. 
97 Idem. 
98 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy fn 95 supra paras 1 and 9.  
99 Opinion of Advocate General Mayras delivered on 11 January 1973 in Case 39/72 Commission v Italy [1973] 
ECR 118,124.  
100 Idem.  
101 Küçük fn 12 supra p. 977 (citing Joined Cases 154, 205, 206, 226–228, 263 and 264/78, 39, 31, 83 and 85/79 
SpA Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v. Commission, 18 March 1980 [1980] ECR 907 para 59. 
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2.2.2 The Equilibrium between Advantages and Obligations in Tachographs 
 
The equilibrium between advantages and obligations is a particular aspect of the subsequent 
Tachographs case102 where a particular understanding of the notion of solidarity was applied 
(albeit simplified), to harmonised measures within a Community regulation. That is, the Court 
imposed a negative obligation to refrain from unilateral action that might disturb the 
equilibrium between the advantages and obligations flowing from the adherence to the 
Community.   
Lastly, the failure of respecting the positive obligation of a duty of solidarity was deemed to 
strike at the fundamental basis of the Community legal order. In Tachographs the Court held 
that “[it] cannot be accepted that a Member State should apply in an incomplete or selective 
manner provisions of a Community regulation so as to render abortive certain aspects of 
Community legislation which it has opposed to or which it considers contrary to its national 
interests …”103  
As noted by MacDonald, we must keep in mind that the signature and adherence to treaties 
renders signatories as parties and bearers of the objectives and values enshrined therein.104 To 
defeat this, would be to act contrary to the principle of solidarity and a duty thereof, as may be 
seen in this passage from Tachographs:  
For a state unilaterally to break, according to its own conception of national interest, the equilibrium 
between the advantages and obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community brings into question 
the equality of Member States before community law and creates discrimination at the expense of their 
nationals. This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to 
the community strikes at the very root of the community legal order. 105 
 
The following will discuss the concept of solidarity ex post, the idea that solidarity as a legal 
principle implies a reinforced proportionality test, and that the Court of Justice has developed 
through the reinforced proportionality test a tool that bridges the ex ante and ex post 
application of a legal principle of solidarity within European Union law.  
 
 
                                                
102 Tachographs fn 7 supra 
103 Tachographs fn 7 supra, para. 9.  
104 MacDonald fn 79 supra. 
105 Tachographs fn 7 supra par 12. The Tachographs case has been widely used as a point of departure for the 
principle of solidarity within European Union law, see Calliess Subsidiaritäts fn 3 supra p. 18 (citing and 
discussing Tachographs fn 7 supra para 12.) 
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3 Ex Post Application of the Legal Principle of Solidarity  
Although a reinforced proportionality test does not have a morality claim per se, it paves the 
way towards a more moral understanding of the law through a reading of solidarity and 
proportionality in parallel throughout the cases we will now present. We now turn from its ex 
ante existence and influence to its ex post application. The elusive question remains, how may 
a legal principle of solidarity be understood as a legal principle which the judiciary may 
utilise to balance competing sub plans in order that nation State or Member State action and 
legal measures, mesh and do not undermine each other in the pursuit of the prior, agreed-upon 
objective?.106 Within its function it is the principle of proportionality which remains as the 
key aide to determining whether or not a principle of solidarity has been infringed.  
As such, sub plan meshing comes very close to the way in which the principle of 
proportionality operates by balancing the acts as being adequate and necessary in order to 
achieve the objective. And here we should keep Mattias Kumm’s view in mind before 
exploring the relationship between the principle of proportionality and the principle of 
solidarity as such: 
Whenever there is a conflict between a principle and countervailing concerns, the proportionality test 
provides the criteria to determine which concerns take precedence under the circumstances… The 
proportionality test provides an analytical structure for assessing whether limits imposed on the realisation 
of a principle in a particular context are justified.107 
 
One strand of conceptualizing solidarity as joint action, namely as subplans that mesh, from a 
legal perspective, comes closer to the understanding of the function of the principle of 
solidarity within EU law. Restated, the reinforced principle of proportionality is a direct legal 
translation of subplans that mesh within a theory of solidarity as joint action. These sub plans 
are measured by the genuine ability, and the effectiveness and certainty of the national 
measure towards the joint action or aim pursued. E.g. whether the Member States have 
unilaterally acted towards a common objective in ways that do not undermine it. The 
decisions of the Member States and whether those are consistant with an understanding of 
solidarity ex ante, influences how the measure or decision is viewed by the European Court of 
Justice ex post. It is within this lens then, that the European Court of Justice places its 
emphasis on the principle of proportionality. Recall that solidarity is a principle that cannot be 
coerced; yet it is open to coercion. Solidarity as joint action entails an objective and an 
                                                
106 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra 
107 Mattias Kumm, “Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights, in Law, Rights and Discourse”, in The 
Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy p. 131-166, George Pavlakos ed (London Hart Publisher 2007) (“Kumm”) at p 
137 
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intention to achieve this objective in common. Nevertheless, the objective itself cannot be 
enforced as such. It is the sub plans which can define the appropriate form of coercion once 
the states make the decision to act on a common intention. 
Three cases that are of profound interest in that light concern two within the arena of 
renewable energy promotion and one recent case concerning allocation mechanisms for 
refugees. The same Advocate General served on all three cases and, it is in his interpretation, 
as well as in the judgments that we can see reflections of some contours of how the principle 
of proportionality helps formulate an ex post application of the principle of solidarity within 
European Union law. The interpretive approach used here applies Sangiovanni´s analytical 
framework of solidarity to recent case law.  
3.1 Sub Plans that Mesh  
More specifically, and as mentioned above, it will apply his notion of sub plans that mesh. 
Here, the principle of solidarity is manifested as an underlying postulate that serves to 
evaluate whether or not unilateral Member State actions mesh with regards to the objective 
pursued.108 As Sangiovanni posits, however, “to be acting in solidarity, we need to form an 
intention that our sub plans mesh. Subplans mesh just in case there is a way for each 
participant to satisfy their subplans that is compatible with achievement of the shared goal”.109 
States are not free to construct and connect technically incompatible stations as their 
contribution to a common telephone system. Several other legal principles also operate in this 
space, among them, solidarity as an end-neutral or joint action, and tensions with the various 
instruments available to the Court in its assessment and interpretation of unilateral actions 
within the bigger whole. That interaction also underlines the necessity of a holistic 
understanding of a legal principle of solidarity. The promise of a principle of solidarity as a 
subtle, and perhaps necessary, form of background coercion to remind us of the commitments 
that follow on the initial intentions.110  
 
The elusive question remains, how a legal principle of solidarity may be understood as a legal 
principle which the judiciary may utilise to find balance among competing sub plans, where 
nation State or Member State action and legal measures mesh and do not undermine each 
other in the pursuit of the prior, agreed-upon objective.  
                                                
108  In this sense, the proportionality test translated into the concept of sub plan meshing is closer to 
Sangiovanni´s understanding than that of Bratman´s views as Bratman´s understanding of sub plan meshing are 
all open ended, yet with the intention of the action that is most important. See e.g. Bratman Faces of Intention fn 
1 supra 
109 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra p. 345 
110 Idem 
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As such, sub plan meshing comes very close to the way in which the principle of 
proportionality operates. Proportionality analysis standing alone as compared with 
proportionality as incorporated within an ex post application of solidarity, cannot reach the 
same coherent conclusions or take into consideration the various elements required for a 
horizontal reading of the Treaties.  
 
While proportionality asks whether the measure is necessary or suitable, solidarity asks 
whether the measure or decision of the Member State was capable of undermining or has 
undermined other Member States, or the contemplated joint action. That indirectly subsumes 
the principle of sincere cooperation. The following cases are examples of background 
coercion by the Court. In the following section, two cases will be presented. They serve as a 
basis for an understanding of the connection between the principle of proportionality and the 
principle of solidarity within European Union law. The tension between voluntary 
cooperation and background coercion is the primary conduit informing how the principle of 
solidarity operates in these cases ex post after the unilateral decision of the Member State is 
examined under the lens of European Union law.  
 
3.2 Example of Cases as Background Coercion Ex Post 
This, then raises the further question of whether the Advocate General, in his Opinions has 
introduced elements of morally informed judgments into the application of rules of European 
Union law. The promotion of renewable energy has been an important joint action within the 
European Union.  A voluntary cooperation mechanism was set in place in order to provide a 
mechanism to enhance cooperative action in the field.111  
 
The Ålands Vindkraft and the Essent cases may be seen as examples of the manifestation of 
one aspect of the principle of solidarity by the measuring stick of the principle of 
proportionality. Both cases are examples of background coercion by the Court. The promotion 
of renewable energy has been the subject of an extensive debate on whether the indicative 
national targets that became mandatory, were or were not, a breach of the principle of 
conferral since, the caveat in Article 194 (2) TFEU states that Member States retain 
                                                
111 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC OJ 2009 L 140/16 (“Directive 2009/28”) 
  
 
39 
competence with regards to the choice of their energy mixes.112 In Sangiovanni´s terms, 
Member States need to overcome significant adversity, yet the question remains whether the 
goal is shared or if Member States individually intend to do their part in achieving this goal.113   
 
Article 194 TFEU reads: 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to 
preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
*** 
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of 
energy; … 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary 
to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without 
prejudice to Article 192(2)(c).114 
 
The legal reasoning of the Ålands Vindkraft, Grand Chamber Judgment115 and Opinion,116 and 
the subsequent Judgment and Opinion in Essent117 set the scene for a more theoretical 
exploration of understanding “the spirit of solidarity” as enshrined within the energy 
provisions for the promotion of renewable energy and its distribution.118  We will view 
unilateral actions or territorial limitations as proportionate or legitimate acts towards the 
object pursued on a European Union level, analysed utilising Sangiovanni’s theory on 
solidarity as joint action. The joint action here is the promotion of renewable energy sources, 
when specified within secondary legislation is the heart of the reinforced proportionality test 
expounded by the Court.  
                                                
112 For more on this topic, see Kim Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013) p.180, where he argues that mandatory renewable energy targets clearly have had a 
significant effect on the energy mixes which: 
…clearly restrict the right of the Member States to decide on their energy mix […] was adopted under the wrong legal 
basis, and is therefore in conflict with the Treaty, provided of course that a requirement that approximately half the 
national electricity production be from renewable energy sources instead of nuclear, coal, natural gas, or other options 
considered to “significantly affect” the right of a Member State to choose between different sources of energy, … 
113  Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra at p. 343 
114 Article 194 TFEU (Emphasis added) 
115 Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, (GC) 1 July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:37 (“Ålands 
Vindkraft”) 
116 Opinion of AG Yves Bot delivered 28 January 2014 in Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v 
Energimyndigheten (“Ålands Vindkraft Opinion”) ECLI:EU:C:2014:37  
117 Case C- 492/14, Essent Belgium NV v Vlaams Gewest and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:257 (“Essent”) (Not to 
be confused with Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12, Essent Belgium v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2192) and Opinion of AG Yves Bot delivered 14 April 2016 in 
Case C-492/14 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaams Gewest and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:257 (“Essent Opinion”) 
118 State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Germany – Support for renewable electricity and reduced EEG- 
surcharge for energy-intensive users, Brussels 18.12.2013, C (2013) 4424 final, OJ C-37/73 
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The legal question in Ålands Vindkraft was whether or not other Member States had a duty to 
open up their support schemes to other Member States and whether a territorial restriction on 
the distribution of renewable energy could be justified. In other words, whether the unilateral 
action could be held to be proportionate towards the objective pursued, that is whether or not 
the unilateral measures or sub plans meshed. In the subsequent Essent case, the question 
regarding territorial limitations also posed itself as the legislative changes reserved 
“distribution solely to generating installations located in the Flemish Region.”119 We will now 
look at both cases from a perspective of solidarity as joint action.  
3.2.1 Ålands Vindkraft AB 
In the Ålands Vindkraft case, Ålands Vindkraft AB, located in the Finnish archipelago Åland, 
exported renewable energy to the Swedish mainland. The plaintiff located in Finland couldn’t 
benefit from support from the Swedish certificate scheme on an equal basis with the Swedish 
national producers since it was not incorporated in Sweden and, as the support scheme had 
territorial limitations.120 According to the Advocate General, Ålands Vindkraft presented the 
Court “with a fresh opportunity to rule on the consistency with EU law of national support 
schemes for energies produced from renewable energy sources under which the support is 
reserved to electricity producers located on the national territory”.121 This led the Advocate 
General to question whether or not Directive 2009/28 permitted “the establishment of a 
national support scheme for electricity produced from renewable energy sources … where 
that scheme reserves the award of those certificates exclusively to green electricity producers 
located at the Member State in question”.122 It logically followed then, for the AG to ask 
“whether the territorial restrictions on access to support schemes of green energy are 
consistent with the requirements of the principle of free movement of goods, or in other words, 
whether Directive 2009/28 is valid in light of Article 34 TFEU”?123  
 
                                                
119 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra para. 33 (citing Belgisch Staatsblad, 30 April 2003, p. 23334, the ‘Decision of 4 
April 2003’. Flemish Decision Vlaams Decreet Houdende de Organisatie van de Elekticiteitsmarks (Flemish 
Decree on the organisation of the electricity market) Belgisch Staatsblad, 22 September 200, p. 32166, the 
Electricity Decree, appealed by Decisions of 28 September 2001, 4 April 2003 and Decision of 5 March 2004.) 
Article 14 of the Decision was worded as follows:  
In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 15 of the [Electricity Decree], free distribution, as referred to in the 
first paragraph of Article 15 of that Decree, is restricted to the feed-in of electricity produced by the generating 
installations connected to the distribution systems in the Flemish region.  
120 Ålands Vindkraft Opinion fn 116 supra para 24. (Referring to the joint scheme as well as the Swedish 
scheme.)  
121 Ålands Vindkraft Opinion fn 116 supra para. 1 
122 Idem Ålands Vindkraft fn 115 supra para. 4  
123 Idem, para. 5 
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This tension gave rise to a myriad of legal questions as it was unclear whether or not such 
territorial restrictions were legitimate with regard to the alleged infringement of the free 
movement of goods.  
The Advocate General argued that “whilst Directive 2009/28 aims to promote the use of green 
energy so that Member States can meet their mandatory targets, it does not permit the 
introduction of discriminatory support schemes, since these would give rise to unlawful 
restrictions on trade”.124 The AG continued, reasoning that his different readings of the 
Directive presupposed no access the restrictions in the schemes. He relied here upon the 
wording of Directive 2009/28, inasmuch as recital 25 of that Directive and its Article 3(3) 
state that Member States are free to decide whether – and if so, to what extent – they wish to 
support the production of green electricity in other Member States, and list the cooperation 
measures, which are optional in nature, to which Member States may have recourse in such 
cases.125  
 
The way in which Member States might choose to cooperate, (which might be seen as the 
principle of solidarity as joint action), was explicitly outlined within the secondary legislation 
at issue. Paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Directive provided: “[w]ithout prejudice to the 
obligations of Member States under Article 3, two or more Member States may decide, on a 
voluntary basis, to join or partly coordinate their national support schemes”.  
 
Thus, the intended cooperation was deemed voluntary, not mandatory.  It was not coerced, yet 
it was open to coercion by way of a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice. In the Swedish 
scheme, and under Swedish law, the preparatory works referred to the reservation of the green 
certificates for green energy production and located their nexus of action within Swedish 
territory. The Advocate General called for a reinforced proportionality test in Ålands 
Vindkraft due to market changes which had exacerbated the conflicts between territorial 
restrictions and renewable energy promotion. More importantly, none of the parties’ 
arguments convinced the Advocate General that territorial restrictions were necessary or 
appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective of environmental protection. He 
argued instead that: 
 
                                                
124 Idem, para. 38 (Emphasis added.) 
125 Idem, para. 40  
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... whilst it is easy to accept that green certificate schemes contribute to environmental protection by 
stimulating the production of green energy, it would, on the other hand, appear somewhat paradoxical to 
assert that the importation of green energy from other Member States might undermine environmental 
protection.126 
 
Accordingly, he reasoned that the answer lay in the balance provided by a reinforced 
proportionality test. 
I take the view — for the reasons which I set out in Essent Belgium, which need not be revisited here — that 
national legislation constituting a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions may be 
justified by the objective of environmental protection even if it is discriminatory, provided, however, that it 
undergoes a particularly rigorous proportionality test, one which I have referred to as ‘reinforced’.127 
 
Significantly, the Court noted the fact that the support schemes at issue were not, and are still 
not, subject to harmonisation. The Court accordingly, held that the territorial limitations at 
issue were necessary, “… since, in particular, EU law has not harmonised the national support 
schemes for green electricity, it is possible in principle for Member States to limit access to 
such schemes to green electricity production located in their own territory”.128  
 
The Court further observed that these “… specifications confirm that the EU legislature did 
not intend to require Member States who opted for a support scheme using green certificates 
to extend that scheme to cover green electricity produced on the territory of another Member 
State.”129 This pointed to the Court’s interpretation of Article 3(3) of the Directive as, in 
specific circumstances permitting territorial restrictions. 130  The Ålands Vindkraft Court 
distinguished the other unharmonized markets in the Union:  
… it should be noted at the outset that, far from seeking to bring about exhaustive harmonisation of national 
support schemes for green energy production, the EU legislature – as is apparent, inter alia, from recital 25 
to Directive 2009/28 – based its approach on the finding that Member States apply different support 
schemes in order to maintain investor confidence and to enable those States to define effective national 
measures in order to achieve their mandatory national overall targets under the directive.131  
 
 
The Court clearly did not accept the AG’s interpretation of legalisation’s non-discrimination 
provisions. Instead, it held that secondary legislation “… prohibits any discrimination as 
regards either rights or obligations of electricity undertakings [including] the obligation of 
Member States to ensure that there is no discrimination in relation to access to distribution 
                                                
126 Ålands Vindkraft Opinion fn 116 supra para. 93  
127 Ålands Vindkraft Opinion fn. 116  supra para. 76 
128 Ålands Vindkraft fn. 115 supra para. 94 
129 Ålands Vindkraft fn.115 supra para. 53 
130 Ålands Vindkraft fn. 115 supra para. 54 
131 Ålands Vindkraft fn 115 supra para 59.   
  
 
43 
systems and to the conditions, in particular the tariff conditions, governing such access”.132  
Pointedly the AG had quoted recital 25 of Directive 2009/28 in support of his argument:  
Member States have different renewable energy potentials and operate different schemes of support for 
[green] energy … at the national level. The majority of Member States apply support schemes that grant 
benefits solely to [green] energy that is produced on their territory. For the proper functioning of national 
support schemes it is vital that Member States can control the effect and costs of their national support 
schemes according to their different potentials. … … it is essential that Member States are able to determine 
if and to what extent their national support schemes apply to [green] energy … produced in other Member 
States and to agree on this by applying the cooperation mechanism provided for in this Directive.133  
 
Thus, it appears that in Ålands Vindkraft the Court saw that solidarity as a legal principle 
might in such a case, justify the enactment of an array of legal measures as well as the 
interpretation of the territory benefitting from environmental protection. Renewable energy is 
a policy area, bridging boundaries between the environmental and energy policies of the 
European Union. Within the tension between territoriality and non-discrimination, lies the 
concept of subplans that mesh as will be shown through two cases infra.134 Ålands Vindkraft 
thus is one example of a case dealing with this rather difficult question, yet its substance 
related primarily to whether or not the Member States were obliged to open their support 
schemes for importing renewable energy into their territory within an internal electricity 
market. 
3.2.2 Essent  
The request for the preliminary ruling in Essent did not concern Directive 2009/28 but rather, 
its close relative, Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 
June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Specifically, the 
issue was raised by Member state rules reserving the benefit of the free distribution of green 
energy to green energy fed directly into the distribution system within the Flemish Region and 
the other areas of which the region forms a part. The AG’s Opinion relied on Ålands 
Vindkraft where “… the Court allowed the benefit of national support schemes for the 
production if green electricity… to be limited solely to the production of green electricity in 
the Member State concerned.”135 However, as the Court noted in its judgment, there had been 
a gradual progression within the internal energy market towards liberalization of the market, 
the priority of feeding renewable energies into the grid as well as free third-party access, from 
                                                
132 Essent fn 117 supra para. 47  
133 Recital 25 of the Preamble to Directive 2009/28 fn 111 supra as quoted in Ålands Vindkraft Opinion fn 116 
supra para 10 
134 Ålands Vindkraft fn 115 supra and Essent fn 117 supra 
135 Essent Opinion fn 117 para 3  
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the time when Ålands Vindkraft had been decided.136 The question therefore became whether 
the reasoning of Ålands Vindkraft could be applied to the facts of the Essent case.137  
The Court distilled an appropriate treatment to give to conflicting policies encompassing 
differences between territorial restrictions on the distribution system, restrictions within the 
support schemes out of its assessment of different situations within the field of renewable 
energy. It distinguished the two situations and concluding that they should be treated 
differently. Since the CJEU found the infringement at issue in Ålands Vindkraft permissible, 
the question now arose as to where that line would be crossed. 
Essent, the subsequent case, demonstrates a situation where a Member State exceeded the 
bounds of discretion and required a reassessment and clarification of the Ålands Vindkraft 
reinforced proportionality test. Essent was, in many ways, a call for a demonstration of the 
reinforced principle of proportionality. In Essent, legislative changes reserved “distribution 
solely to generating installations located in the Flemish Region.”138  
The appellant company Essent argued that, as a result of these legislative changes, it had 
suffered damage from loss of the benefits of the free distribution of distribution within the 
Flemish region.139 Could there be any justification for such discrimination?140  
Referring to the Ålands Vindkraft case, the Advocate General opined, somewhat in contrast to 
his previous Opinion in Ålands Vindkraft, that: “… it is possible to infer that the Court 
accepts that discriminatory national measures may be justified by the objective of 
environmental protection, subject to the condition that they comply with the principle of 
                                                
136 Essent fn 117 supra para. 76:  
[I]t must be borne in mind that the open third party access to transmission and distribution systems … constitutes one of 
the essential measures which the Member States are required to implement in order to bring about the completion of the 
internal market in electricity…  
137 Essent fn 117 supra para 85 
138 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra para. 33 (citing Belgisch Staatsblad, 30 April 2003, p. 23334, the ‘Decision of 4 
April 2003’. Flemish Decision Vlaams Decreet Houdende de Organisatie van de Elekticiteitsmarks (Flemish 
Decree on the organisation of the electricity market) Belgisch Staatsblad, 22 September 200, p. 32166, the 
Electricity Decree, appealed by Decisions of 28 September 2001, 4 April 2003 and Decision of 5 March 2004.) 
Article 14 was worded as follows:  
In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 15 of the [Electricity Decree], free distribution, as referred to in the 
first paragraph of Article 15 of that Decree, is restricted to the feed-in of electricity produced by the generating 
installations connected to the distribution systems in the Flemish region.  
139 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra para. 40 (Footnote omitted.) 
140 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra, para. 65 where the Advocate General argued that”[a] phenomenon whereby 
discrimination is concealed emerges clearly from the case-law, although the process that is at play in reaching 
that result is shrouded in a certain degree of mystery.”  
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proportionality”.141  That is, the joint action here was required to entail measures or sub plans 
that mesh. In contrast to Ålands Vindkraft however, the Essent case concerned rules reserving 
the benefit of the free distribution of green energy solely to green energy fed directly into the 
distribution system within the Flemish Region and the other areas of which this region forms 
a part.  
The Advocate General´s Opinion relied once more on Ålands Vindkraft where “… the Court 
allowed the benefit of national support schemes for the production if green electricity … to be 
limited solely to the production of green electricity in the Member State concerned.”142 
Taking one step back, and reminding the reader of the objective of the national legislation, the 
Advocate General argued that it was “necessary to ascertain whether the national legislation 
at issue in the main proceedings [was] appropriate for ensuring the objective of environmental 
protection … and whether or not it [went] beyond what [was] necessary in order to achieve 
that objective”. That question goes right to the heart of the proportionality test, in other words 
the balancing of the various national schemes (or sub plans) towards the common objective 
(or the joint action). The development of the renewable energy promotion framework and 
particularly the development within the internal electricity market had wrought significant 
changes to the legal landscape since the last battle. Whereas in Ålands Vindkraft it was 
possible to limit access to the schemes, the territorial limitation free distribution as seen in a 
case with territorial restrictions did not provide a rationale giving direct support to producers.  
3.2.3 A Reinforced Proportionality Test  
The question then in Essent became whether the reasoning from Ålands Vindkraft could or 
could not be applied.  While in Ålands Vindkraft it was possible to limit access to the schemes, 
the territorial limitation free distribution as seen in a case with territorial restrictions, that 
iteration of a reinforced proportionality test could not provide a rationale for situations where 
the legislation provided direct financial support to producers.  
Thus, the Essent Court expanded its proportionality analysis, extending it to encompass 
unilateral action in respect of the territorial limitations, in question. The introduction of 
another element into the renewable energy debate, namely its distribution, was the key to the 
decision. Now, the Essent Court, two years after Ålands Vindkraft, and with the same 
                                                
141 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra para. 71. Within this argumentation, the author reminds the reader that AG Bot 
called for a reinforced proportionality test in the Ålands Vindkraft case. See fn 115 supra  
142 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra para. 3 
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Advocate General, expounded a reinforced proportionality test, which seemingly upset the 
principles the Grand Chamber had just established.  
AG Bot did not see any reason for a change, especially so soon after the Ålands Vindkraft 
decision, although the Advocate General did not subscribe to its reasoning. In Essent the 
Advocate General did not see how territorial limitations could be viewed as differently 
situated in the distribution and support of the promotion of renewable energies, arguing that 
“[h]aving already had the opportunity to set out the reasons why such territorial limitations on 
support schemes do not seem to me to be compatible with the free movement of goods, … I 
shall not mount to a rear-guard action, although I do not find the Courts reasoning in those 
judgments to be persuasive”.143   
The Essent Court however, found it necessary to add several new criteria to the mix, namely 
the criteria of genuine ability, effectiveness and the certainty of the measure: 
… it must be concluded that the genuine ability of that scheme to achieve the legitimate objective pursued in 
the present case, which is to create an incentive for operators to produce more green electricity 
notwithstanding the additional costs of production, thus contributing to the Member State´s achievement of 
the indicative production targets imposed on them under [the Directive] has not been established.144 
 
The Essent Court also added a requirement for a triple-fulfilment criterion, consisting of an 
assessment of the unilateral action´s genuine ability, certainty and effectiveness. Genuine 
ability, and certain and effective way, were also criteria applied by the Court to the various 
unilateral sub plans to measure whether or not they mesh: 
On account of that indirect, uncertain and risky nature, and given that there were, moreover, other methods – 
such as, for example, the grant of green certificates – which do contribute in a certain and effective way to 
the pursuit of the objective of increasing green electricity production, notably without undermining the 
introduction of third-party free access to distribution systems on terms that are non-discriminatory, as 
provided for [in the Directive] it must be concluded that regional legislation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings does not satisfy the requirements arising under the principle of proportionality, and that the 
interference with that free access and with the free movement of goods which it entails cannot, therefore, be 
justified by that objective.145 
 
The legal reasoning of the Grand Chamber Judgment and Opinion in Ålands Vindkraft as well 
the Judgment and the Opinion in Essent sets the scene for a more theoretical exploration and 
understanding of “the spirit of solidarity” as enshrined within the energy provisions related to 
                                                
143 Essent Opinion fn 117 supra, para. 4 
144 Essent fn 117 supra para 115.  
145 Essent fn 117 supra para 116.  
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the promotion of renewable energy and its distribution.146 The sub plans in this section are the 
national renewable energy policies that are influenced by the joint actions agreed upon at the 
European Union level. In its line of interpretation, the European Court of Justice holds that 
these national energy policies must not contravene the shared goals. In order to do so, the 
background coercion by the Court consists of a reminder to the Member States of the agreed-
upon objective. The background coercion of the joint action runs through an examination of 
the various sub plans of the Member states in general, filtered through a proportionality 
analysis. The enhanced or reinforced proportionality test is therefore a measure that may set 
out in detail, how the Court interprets the various national sub plans against the intention 
pursued.  
4 The Importance of Solidarity in the Future Architecture of European Union Law 
The discussions above have focused on explaining the current legal debate with regard to 
solidarity as a legal principle, the possible explanations from a theoretical standpoint as well 
as from a case law perspective. This debate is important as it seems that the existing 
principles cannot adequately incorporate the requisite flexibility of interpretation necessary 
for the current challenges faced within the European Union legal order. Solidarity might 
become solely a justiciable principle bearing its main elements as a reminder of the 
obligations enshrined within the Treaties.  
 
Nevertheless, this is also where solidarity as a justiciable principle reaches its limits. Without 
the member states’ political will not to undermine each other or alternatively to better define 
the joint action, a legal principle of solidarity would then only be of a legal interpretative 
nature. Yet, the necessity of defining this principle in case law and in European Union law, 
particularly with regard to primary law, could ease the interpretative perils European Union 
law now faces. Knowing what solidarity is and knowing what solidarity does as a legal 
principle is of outmost importance for the future European legal construct. Without directly 
elaborating its application or function, the European Court of Justice has underlined that the 
principle of solidarity exists not only as a peripheral argumentation but at the “root of the 
Community´s legal order”.147  
 
                                                
146 See e.g. State aid SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) – Germany – Support for renewable electricity and 
reduced EEG-surcharge for energy-intensive users, Brussels 18.12.2013, C (2013) 4424 final, OJ C-37/73 
147 Tachographs case fn 7 supra  
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The final part of this thesis will provide a line of argumentation where the fine line between a 
reinforced principle of proportionality and solidarity is to be found, the necessity of finding a 
principle of solidarity is underlined and finally some perspectives of these elements as a 
whole with regards to the future of European integration. It is this line of thought that should 
be brought to bear in legal reasoning. Other principles of European Union law do not cease to 
apply yet it is important to have a holistic perspective on the way in which they may interact 
with a legal principle of solidarity that could, in the future, be useful to the Court´s 
adjudication of tensions with these other principles. The next section will explain the fine line 
between solidarity and proportionality, the necessity of solidarity as a legal principle in 
European Union law 
4.1 The Fine Line Between a Reinforced Principle of Proportionality and Solidarity  
The elements of sub plans that mesh may complicate the understanding of solidarity as joint 
action but they are, nonetheless useful, if the principle of proportionality is to be taken into 
account ex post.148 According to Sangiovanni, “to be acting in solidarity, we need to form an 
intention that our sub plans mesh. Subplans mesh just in case there is a way for each 
participant to satisfy their subplans that is compatible with achievement of the shared goal”.149 
The reinforced principle of proportionality could therefore be interpreted as a direct legal 
manifestation of subplans that mesh as measured by the genuine ability of, and effectiveness 
and certainty of the national measure towards the joint action i.e. whether the Member States 
have unilaterally acted towards the common objective in ways that do not undermine it.  
 
It appears that the Court has already seen that solidarity as a legal principle may in some cases 
be deemed necessary to justify enactment of an array of legal measures as well as the 
interpretation of the way in which a joint action should be achieved. To reach an explicit 
understanding of the principle of solidarity, a line of interpretation consisting of examining 
the intent not to undermine each other, and the importance of sub plans that mesh is useful to 
outline how the legal principle of solidarity is to function. 150  
 
As Sangiovanni argues, there is not necessarily a contradiction between upholding one goal 
and upholding divergent interests, and here the conditions and relations between the actors are 
key so that “as long as we are not actively undermining our shared goal or each other, there is 
                                                
148 Bratman Faces of Intention, fn. 1 supra 
149 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn 1 supra, p. 345 
150 See Macdonald fn 79 supra 
  
 
49 
no need to sacrifice our other, non-convergent goals for the maximal realisation of the shared 
goal”.151 Let us revise the criteria for solidarity as joint action before proceeding to a recent 
judgment that highlights the connection between the principle of proportionality and the 
principle of solidarity even more than the energy cases. The intention to promote renewable 
energy both in production and in distribution was apparent in both cases. Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of the sub plans towards the intended joint action was different. In the first case, 
the European Court of Justice deemed that the sub plans keeping territorial limitations did not 
harm the intention to promote the use of renewable energy sources, as the cooperation was 
voluntary. This voluntary cooperation was stipulated as a joint action in secondary legislation 
and left no doubt as to whether or not the Member States could decide to limit their support 
schemes to the national territory if not in a voluntary cooperation. In the second case, the sub 
plans of territorial limitation harmed the intention of a functioning internal electricity market 
and the agreement not to discriminate was through secondary legislation mandatory. The 
Advocate General´s Opinion in the first case, arguing that the sub plans did not mesh to the 
agreed intention is nevertheless convincing. From this point, the reinforced proportionality 
test was launched in order to ensure that a stricter line of interpretation was followed in cases 
where there was doubt as to whether or not the national sub plans could or could not harm the 
joint action. 
 
In Ålands Vindkraft, the direct response to these conflicting norms of duty and objective was a 
call for, and the construction of, a reinforced proportionality test.152 In my opinion, this 
reinforced proportionality test should be viewed through the twin lenses of additional layers 
of genuine ability, and the degree of certainty and effectiveness of the measures in question, 
so as to identify when and where those unilateral subplans mesh. This case may represent one 
of the first legal manifestations of the “invisible” spirit of solidarity within the energy 
provisions.  
There, one strand of solidarity as joint action, namely the subplans that mesh, from a legal 
perspective, comes closer to an understanding of a working definition of the principle of 
solidarity within EU law. Referring to primary law, the finalisation of the internal electricity 
                                                
151 Sangiovanni Joint Action, fn 1 supra p. 345 
152 Yves Bot’s proposed a reinforced proportionality test in his Ålands Vindkraft Opinion, fn 116 supra para. 79: 
I take the view — for the reasons which I set out in Essent Belgium, which need not be revisited here — that national 
legislation constituting a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions may be justified by the objective 
of environmental protection even if it is discriminatory, provided, however, that it undergoes a particularly rigorous 
proportionality test, one which I have referred to as ‘reinforced’.  
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market as joint action is now “ensured” and has entailed several prohibitions on territorial 
limitations, namely those related to third party non-discriminatory access to the grids as well 
as a protection of the mandatory relocation mechanisms.  Thus, sub plans were required to 
mesh on all levels. The absence of harmonising measures in specific secondary legislation has 
created a space where non-discrimination has found less traction. Here we find that the 
criteria of genuine ability to achieve the objective (certain and effective way) defined and 
refined the way in which sub-plans (unilateral action) meshed with the overall legitimate 
objective, through a reinforced proportionality test interpreting the various sub plans related 
to the objective pursued.153 E.g. whether or not Member States have unilaterally acted towards 
the common objective in ways that do not undermine it. By opening up the understanding of 
the principle to this kind of interpretation, and by meshing both the political and legal 
justifications, the Court’s jurisprudence now stands at a point where the collective good aimed 
to be achieved is no longer justified solely on a purely on a balancing basis but requires 
additional moral underpinning and argumentation. This substitution of compatibility over 
competence reminds us of the way in which unilateral action in such a case may not permit a 
Member State to apply, in an incomplete or selective manner, provisions of Community 
legislation so as to render them nugatory.154 A reinforced principle of proportionality is 
insufficient to enhance the both the legal certainty and the morality of European Union law. 
The next section, discusses the necessity of the discovery of a principle of solidarity.  
4.2 The Necessity of a Legal Principle of Solidarity in European Union Law   
The principle of proportionality be it simple or reinforced provides the equity value necessary 
for a properly functioning principle of solidarity. Proportionality in such case may be an 
excellent tool to measure the rights of the parties. Nevertheless, it does a poor job when it 
comes to measuring obligations or the morality of the claims. 155  Proportionality only 
determines the existence of an infringement of a right and then balances that finding of 
infringement against the objective pursued. As such, it cannot claim that someone ought to act 
positively but is rather an after-the-fact reaction. Further, proportionality is more neutral than 
a legal principle of solidarity. It does not necessarily underline the importance of duty bearers, 
but instead attempts a balance between various objectives. As argued by Kai Möller: 
                                                
153 Sangiovanni Joint Action, fn 1 supra p. 15 
154 Tachographs fn 7  supra 
155 For this, see Kai Möller Dworkin's Theory of Rights in the Age of Proportionality LSE Leg Stud WP no 
11/2017 (2017) Forthcoming in 12 L & Ethics of Human Rights. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981003 (“Möller”)  
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 …the doctrine does not give any indication as to its moral foundation – which is illustrated by the fact that 
its most famous theoretical account, namely Robert Alexy`s theory of rights as principles and optimisation 
requirements, is a formal theory – while offering a structure that has proven to be so useful that it has 
become the globally dominant tool of rights adjucation.156  
 
 
Kai Möller continues, observing that the “proportionality-based strand of rights discourse” 
has to be nuanced, leaving a place for other principles that entail obligations. Solidarity is 
such a principle. The following, quite recent case provides a good illustration of how 
solidarity enriches the principle of proportionality. Although it is not a case concerning 
renewable energy legislation, it gives a broader and deeper understanding to solidarity as a 
principle of European Union law. The case is closely related to the fourth criteria of 
solidarity, namely whether or not the Member States are disposed to share one another’s fates 
in ways relevant to the shared goal. The situation was explained by the Advocate General and 
a firmer manifestation of solidarity was achieved through the Court’s reaction to his 
interpretation. 
 
Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European Union157 was a Grand Chamber 
Judgment rendered 6 September 2017, with an Opinion by Advocate General Yves Bot 
delivered 26 July 2017. The case revolved around the Slovak Republic and Hungary’s votes 
against adoptation of a decision of the Council adopted by qualified majority in respect of the 
immigration crises.158 That decision was adopted on the basis of Article 78 (3) TFEU which 
provides that: 
 
 in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a 
sudden inflow of national of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the [European Commission], 
may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after 
consulting the European Parliament.159  
 
The contested decision as to which the Slovak Republic and Hungary sought annulment was a 
decision adopted “in order to deal with [the] migration crisis and the pressure which it placed 
on the asylum regimes in the Italian Republic and the Hellenic Republic”.160  
                                                
156 Möller fn 155 p. 2  
157 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council (GC) 6 September 2017 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:618 (“Slovakia and Hungary v Council”) 
158 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra 
159 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 2 
160 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 4 referring to Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 
22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures on the area of international protection for the benefit of 
Italy and Greece  
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The AG argued that the decision represented “an expression of solidarity which the Treaty 
envisages between Member States”.161 According to the Advocate General, the case required 
a call for solidarity:  
The present action provides me with an opportunity to recall that solidarity is among the cardinal values of 
the Union and is even among the foundations of the Union. How would it be possible to deepen the 
solidarity between the peoples of Europe and to envisage ever-closer union between those peoples, as 
advocated in the Preamble to the EU Treaty, without solidarity between the Member States when one of 
them is faced with an emergency situation? I am referring here to the quintessence of what is both the raison 
d`être and the objective of the European project.162 
 
 
While the AG asserted that solidarity was a “founding and existential value of the Union”163, 
he also identified solidarity as “a set of values and principles that constitutes ’the bedrock of 
the European construction’”.164 Nevertheless, that begged the question of whether solidarity is 
a principle not to be coerced yet a principle that is open to coercion:  
The particular feature of the contested decision is that it establishes a relocation mechanism on the basis of 
allocations assigned to Member States which are binding in nature. With that decision, solidarity between 
Member States has a specific content and a binding nature. That essential and innovative characteristic of 
the decision explains the politically sensitive nature of the present cases, since it has crystallised the 
opposition on the part of Member States which advocate freely consented solidarity based solely on 
voluntary commitments.165 
 
Here is a case where mandarity relocation mechanisms were at the heart of the legal issue. 
Both Member States argued that the contested decision breached the principle of 
proportionality.166 The Advocate General maintained that the decision did not breach any of 
the elements in the proportionality test, such as the appropriateness of the measure for 
attaining the legitimate objective pursued (or the joint action) and that the decision did not 
exceed the limits of what was necessary in order to achieve those objectives.167 He viewed the 
relationship between solidarity and proportionality as quite settled:  
While it is clear to me that the appropriateness [principle of proportionality] of the contested decision for 
attaining the objective which it pursues cannot be disputed by the applicants on the basis of its weakness of 
its application or of its ineffectiveness in practice … one thing which come to my mind is indisputable, 
                                                
161 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 16 
162 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 17  
163 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 18  
164 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 19 referring Favreau, B., ‘La Charte des droits 
fondamentaux: pourquoi et comment?’, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne après le 
traité de Lisbonne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2010, pp. 3 to 38, in particular p. 13. See also Bieber, R., and Maiani, F., 
‘Sans solidarité point d’Union européenne, Regards croisés sur les crises de l’Union économique et monétaire et 
du Système européen commun d’asile’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, Dalloz, Paris, 2012, p. 295.  
For a collection of contributions relating to the principle of solidarity, see Boutayeb, C., La solidarité dans 
l’Union européenne– Éléments constitutionnels et matériels, Dalloz, Paris, 2011. 
165 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 23 
166 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 218 
167 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra paras. 219-318 
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namely that the decision can succeed in resolving the emergency situation that justified its adoption only on 
condition that all the Member States, in the spirit of solidarity as that which constitutes the raison d`être, 
make an effort to implement it.168 
 
It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that the non-application of the contested decision also constitutes 
a breach of the obligation concerning solidarity and the fair sharing of burdens expressed in Article 80 
TFEU. To my mind here there is no doubt that, in an action for failure to fulfil obligations on this matter, the 
Court would be entitled to remind the offending Member States if their obligations, and to do so in no 
uncertain terms, as it has done in the past.169  
 
It does not seem coincidental that the judgments referred indirectly to the reasoning of the 
Court of Justice in Tachographs on this point. That is an indication that according to the AG, 
Tachographs’ line of interpretation holds continued vitality. It is also important for our 
purposes, as it navigates the space between the ex ante existence and ex post application of 
the principle of solidarity within European Union law as such.  
The following passage from the AG’s Opinion also finds a parallel between the principle of 
solidarity and mandatory Treaty requirements, as the previous cases within the area of 
renewable energy had shown:   
… the assertion, which to a large extent crystallises the opposition to the contested decision shown by 
certain Member States, that the objective pursued by that decision ought to have been achieved solely by 
means of voluntary commitments on the part of the Member States to receive a certain number of applicants 
does not bear scrutiny. The genesis of the contested decision shows that it was because consensus could not 
be reached between all Member States on a voluntary distribution among them of the applicants for 
international protection that it was decided to opt for a mandatory relocation mechanism, that is to say, one 
based on binding quantitative allocations.170 
 
The AG’s observation, that mandatory and quantitative quotas take precedence over Member 
state voluntary distributions because those were insufficient, might just as well apply to the 
promotion of renewable energy sources. There, indicative targets were indicative, cooperation 
is voluntary, yet with the immense challenge of climate change and the difficulties involved 
in administering a European energy policy, we may well find the same line of interpretation 
apropriate.  The Court of Justice in that judgment rejected the Member States allegations of a 
breach of the principle of proportionality.171 Nonetheless it does not explicitly mention a 
                                                
168 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 241 my comment 
169 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 242 citing judgment of 7 February 1973, 
Commission v Italy (39/72, fn 95 supra): 
 “where the Court held that, ‘in permitting Member States to profit from the advantages of the Community, the Treaty 
imposes on them also the obligation to respect its rules. For a State unilaterally to break, according to its own conception 
of national interest, the equilibrium between advantages and obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community 
brings into question the equality of Member States before [Union] law and creates discriminations at the expense of 
their nationals … This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence to the 
Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the [Union] legal order’ (paragraphs 24 and 25). See also judgment of 
7 February 1979, Commission v United Kingdom (128/78, EU:C:1979:32, paragraph 12) 
170 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 259  
171 Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 157 supra paras. 206-310 
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reinforced principle of proportionality and does not refer in any manner to the requirement of 
of genuine ability.172 Although the cases examined here come from two different policy areas, 
it is rather interesting to see that solidarity and proportionality were linked in order to aid in 
the Court’s interpretation. The Court of Justice refers implicidly to solidarity as enshrined in 
Slovakia and Hungary v Council 173 but also more explicitly:  
As regards Hungary’s complaint that the contested decision does not include criteria for determining which 
is the Member State of relocation, it must be recalled that, as is made clear in recital 2 of the decision and as 
has been stated, inter alia, in paragraphs 253 and 291 to 293 of the present judgment, the decision took 
account of Article 80 TFEU, which applies when the European Union’s asylum policy is implemented and, 
in particular, when provisional measures based on Article 78(3) TFEU are adopted and from which it 
follows that the determination of the Member State of relocation must be based on criteria related to 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States.174 
 
As stated there, solidarity is not to be coerced yet it is open to coercion. The challenge 
remains for solidarity to be understood as a legal principle entailing both obligations and not 
merely “rights.”175 Mattias Kumm stresses the importance of proportionality balancing i.e. 
“… how proportionality is connected to the idea of rights and how it actually operates as a 
test to assess the limits of rights”.176 Yet, the limits of obligations are also tested through this 
balancing as well as the scope of the obligations. The principle of proportionality goes to the 
heart of the ex post application of solidarity underlining the obligation of the Member State. 
The meshing of the sub plans is closely related, but not identical to the commitment or claim 
“not to bypass each other´s will”. This is what could be translated into action by a theory of 
proportionality where a reinforced proportionality test has been introduced ex post.  
 
According to AG Maduro, “the principle of proportionality entails a consideration of the costs 
and benefits of a measure enacted by a Member State in the light of the different interest 
which Community rules deem worthy of protection”.177 This leads us to the final part of the 
thesis, namely a future outlook on a legal principle of solidarity bearing on the future of 
European integration.  
                                                
172 See the discussions concerning the Essent case section 3.2.2 supra 
173 Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 157 supra para. 2  
174 Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 157 supra para. 329  
175 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Nethelands Inland 
Revenue Administration 5 February 1963 [1963] ECR Spec Eng Ed 1, 12 (“Van Gend & Loos”.) 
…Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but 
also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the 
Member States and upon the institutions of the Community. 
176 Kumm, fn. 107 supra, p. 136  
177 Opinion of AG Maduras delivered 13 June 2006 in Case C-434/04 Ahokainen and Leppik v Virallinen 
syyttäjä [2006] ECR I-9173 (“Ahoikainen Opinion”) para 23  
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4.3 Finding Solidarity in the European Union Future Legal Framework 
Even though the Court has still not set out a clear normative definition of solidarity it may 
now have waltzed around it sufficiently that Member States have a better idea of the dance 
steps. Sangiovanni underlines that cooperation or acting in solidarity should not be easily 
upset or deflected.178 Nevertheless, the current challenges faced within the European Union 
calls for a restatement or renewal.  
 
Proportionality alone seems to be an inadequate test to evaluate Member States’ inherent 
moral obligations to European Union law as signatories of the treaties as well as for matters 
where mandatory obligations are jeopardised by unilateral action. That may also echo the plea 
or warning issued by the Advocate General in the Ahoikainen case where “… another crisis is 
concealed, namely the crisis of the European integration project, which is to a large extent 
based on a requirement for solidarity between the Member States which have decided to take 
part in that project”.179 Solidarity is, by far, one of the most frequently mentioned notions 
within the Treaties. Nevertheless, without a legally binding or guiding definition of the 
principle, much of the glue holding European Union member states together is at risk of 
coming unstuck.  Whether or not a Member State has acted in solidarity is therefore 
determined by an arbiter, the Court, by reference to whether or not the unilateral Member 
state action does or does not contribute to what has already been agreed upon to be “jointly 
achieved” as the principle of proportionality acts as a sub-set, overseeing the principle of 
solidarity when seen as joint action. It is important to note that solidarity is more than the sum 
of its parts, that it is separate and separable from the sum of the individual interests:  
 
[a]fter pointing out that the concept of ‘solidarity’ is not defined anywhere in the Treaties, those authors observe that 
‘the Treaties confer on that concept a scope that varies according to the context — sometimes an objective or parameter 
for EU action, sometimes a basic value, sometimes a criterion of the obligations to which the Member States have 
subscribed by acceding to the European Union. The common denominator that links those various emanations of 
solidarity in the context of the European Union is the recognition of the existence of a “common interest”, separate from 
and separable from the sum of the individual interests. 180  
                                                
178 Sangiovanni Joint Action fn. 1 supra, p. 346 
179 Ahoikainen Opinion fn 177 supra para. 24 referring to Labayle, S., op. cit.: 
who observes, in regard to the discrepancies which have appeared between Member States in the management of that 
migration crisis, that while it is necessary to ‘be wary of any tendency to dramatise, … nonetheless the fear of the 
danger that the work patiently built up over more than half a century will disintegrate cannot be ignored. Such a gradual 
undermining of the foundations threatens the entire edifice and reinforces the need for absolute vigilance with respect to 
the matter. Failure by its own Member States to respect the founding principles of the Union introduces a potential 
factor of the disintegration of elements which are essential to its continuity and to the logic of its functioning” 
(point 1 182, p. 477). See also Chassin, C.-A., ‘La crise des migrants: l’Europe à la croisée des chemins’, Revue Europe, 
No 3, LexisNexis, 2016, pp. 15 to 21, in particular point 43, p. 21, which states that ‘the migrant crisis is … a human 
crisis, but also a moral crisis, for the European Union: beyond the short-term answers, it underlines the fragility of the 
European construction’. 
180 Opinion Slovakia and Hungary v Council fn 8 supra para. 19 referring Favreau, B., ‘La Charte des droits 
fondamentaux: pourquoi et comment?’, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne après le 
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This paragraph is worth quoting as it includes the gist of what solidarity as a principle entails. 
Mindful of the fact that the concept varies according to context, it is the latter that has been 
the focus of this thesis.  
The focus has been to perceive solidarity not merely as a criterion but rather as a principle of 
the obligations to which the Member States have subscribed by acceding to the Union. From 
this stem both the the ex ante existence as well as the ex post application of solidarity. The 
ways in which the Court interprets and integrates solidarity within the cases referred to and 
interfaces it with the other general principles of EU law should take on greater importance. 
Here, it is extremely useful to examine the reception of a principle based on morality within 
the current legal transnational legal (dis)order. 181  There has to be a community, an 
international community to which we owe solidarity, not to the other States but to a “higher 
order”.182  
There has, perhaps, now been a redirection or renewal with regard to conceiving the principle 
of solidarity and that of proportionality through an assessment of voluntary cooperation 
mechanisms.  
That is, if sub plans do not mesh in order to achieve the objective, the proportionality test has, 
through application of the principle of solidarity, rendered national measures mandatory in 
order to counterbalance the lack of such commitments from the Member States themselves. 
Solidarity as joint action thus defined requires a double-layered understanding of the law in 
intersecting with other principles as well as an understanding of a newfound solidarity test 
that incorporates an extended interpretation of proportionalit by adding morality to its claim.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
traité de Lisbonne, Bruylant, Brussels, 2010, pp. 3 to 38, in particular p. 13. See also Bieber, R., and Maiani, F., 
‘Sans solidarité point d’Union européenne, Regards croisés sur les crises de l’Union économique et monétaire et 
du Système européen commun d’asile’, Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, Dalloz, Paris, 2012, p. 295.  
For a collection of contributions relating to the principle of solidarity, see Boutayeb, C., La solidarité dans 
l’Union européenne– Éléments constitutionnels et matériels, Dalloz, Paris, 2011. 
181 See the quotation in Tuori, fn 32 supra (Adding that the proposed master principles of law does not bring 
order to the disorder. Idem, at p. 24) 
182 Comments by Brun-Otto Bryde in the discussion following the presentation by Karel Wellens in Wellens fn  
3 supra p. 53  
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Conclusion  
When examined from a broader perspective, the principle of solidarity in European Union law 
is found to entail three dimensions. First, it is a positive obligation to achieve the aims set 
forth. Second, it is a negative obligation to not to undermine the objectives set forth. Third, it 
is a supplement to the proportionality test to add a moral claim to the Court’s balancing act.  
Nonetheles, without a proper definition or understanding of its legal and moral properties, the 
European Union risks losing itself in a maze of confusion among its most fundamental 
concepts, principles and bases of legal argumentation. Without such an attempt, the concept 
of solidarity risks becoming a vague or even nugatory principle within the Treaties without a 
clear and useable definition – thus threatening an expression of the very foundation upon 
which the Union was built. A different perspective on solidarity as a legal principle within 
European Union law needs to be found. A renewed search for its meaning, interpretation and 
implications is vital to the future European Union legal architecture. Thus, a truncated 
understanding of where solidarity applies and how it is applied by the Court leaves a gap with 
too high a cost which risks undermining the European integration project as a whole.  
 
Solidarity is an essential element incorporating both the will to jointly achieve common 
objectives as well as Member State loyalty to the adherence to the shared objectives of the 
Union. The thesis has set out a description of the conceptual framework of current academic 
debates with respect to a legal principle of solidarity within European Union law. After 
framing the theoretical basis of a theory of solidarity as joint action as coined by Andreas 
Sangiovanni, the thesis attempts to show how solidarity should be understood temporally in 
both its ex ante existence through the principles of conferral and sincere cooperation, and 
additionally in its application ex post where a reinforced principle of proportionality leads us 
towards an understanding of a workable solidarity test. Accordingly, the thesis has made an 
attempt to provide a more nuanced perspective to explain why solidarity is related to, but 
albeit different from other legal principles when applied separately. These principles operate 
in concert and, in concert are essential for the forming of an understanding of solidarity. 
Recent developments within European Union case law are a real-world demonstration that a 
morality/ethics based claimed based of a solidarity principle may be usefully incorporated 
into the Court’s “toolbox” to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
the law is observed. 
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This thesis has made distinction between the ex ante existence and the ex post application of 
solidarity to provide a tool for distinguishing between the two temporal dimensions of 
Member State action. The ex ante existence of solidarity represents a promise of cooperation 
ex ante through the principle of conferral and sincere cooperation. The ex post existence of 
solidarity is the judicial evaluation of whether or not the promise has been kept. This thesis 
proposes to contribute to European Union law scholarship by assessing whether a more 
ambitious, holistic claim may be made towards and interpretation of the principle of solidarity 
could be made.  
 
The tendency has been to use the proportionality test as a firm line of legal argumentation. 
Nevertheless, the balancing of whether measures are proportionate gives scholars and 
practitioners alike little insight into the moral claims connected to European integration. 
Searching for solidarity as a legal argument, and finding its application is therefore of outmost 
importance. A legal line of interpretation for a principle of solidarity in European Union law 
may help both the Member States, the Court of Justice and the European Union itself out of 
the current circular discourse on the proportionality of these measures. It may also become a 
reminder of both positive and negative obligations flowing from the adherence to the Treaties. 
It is more than fair to say that the European Union has been experiencing a crisis of fate. 
During this crisis, several important moral and legal questions have come to the fore.  
 
The necessity of redefining and framing an interpretation of a legal principle of solidarity is 
not only timely, it is necessary. Its moral connotations remind signatories of the Treaties 
within the European Union that what is expected of their cooperation is more than creation of 
a market, that there should be a balance between the advantages and obligations, and finally 
that the time could be ripe for a reorientation and perhaps a rewriting of the framework as a 
whole. An inconsistent notion of what solidarity as a legal principle actually entails and how 
it operates, risks weakening the legal architecture and moral foundation of the Lisbon treaty 
and of its acquis. The rediscovery of values and principles is a fragile undertaking fraught 
with its own interpretive perils. Nevertheless, claims to their normative superiority have a 
rather uncertain and inadequately explained content. European Union law may inspire and 
assist scholars and practitioners alike in their understanding of the principle of solidarity. This 
thesis suggests the possibility of a more coherent framing of solidarity as a legal principle in 
European Union law.  
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This approach may assist legal scholarship in moving forward to build upon existing literature 
within the field and integrate a more holistic model of the legal principle of solidarity in 
European Union law based on a theory defining solidarity as joint action. The latter may 
better reflect the various legal correlates that together define this principle both ex ante and ex 
post.  
 
First, the existence of solidarity as a legal principle ex ante could be interpreted an 
intersection between the principle of sincere cooperation and the principle of conferral. 
Second, the application of the principle of solidarity ex post draws a reinforced principle of 
proportionality that balances the unilateral actions towards the aim to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, there is no moral claim to this balancing and thus the Court interacts with a 
second reminder of the principle of solidarity as such – adding a different layer to the 
proportionality test. 
 
Solidarity functions as a legitimate reminder of the obligations set forth within the Treaties 
incorporating the principle of sincere cooperation as well as a reinforced principle of 
proportionality. Thus, the important question that has been asked and answered is whether we 
are currently witnessing a shift from a strict test of proportionality towards a separate test of 
solidarity within the European legal landscape. A reinforced principle of proportionality is an 
added value in the tool box of the European Court of Justice, without an explicit mention of 
the moral connotations of a principle of solidarity. This indirectly creates a bridge to a wider 
interpretation of a legal principle of solidarity in European Union law. Not only does the 
emerging form of reinforced principle of proportionality add more elements to the 
proportionality test used by the Court. There are currently glimpses in case law indicating the 
developing a new reading of the legal principle of solidarity– perhaps not unlike the 
developments seen in the creation of the principle of direct effect and primacy in that 
historical period. In this light, the proposed interpretation of a legal principle of solidarity is 
best explained in conjunction with the theory of solidarity as joint action as coined by Andrea 
Sangiovanni.  
 
To reach for a legal definition of solidarity that cannot be morally or politically effectuated is 
a matter of concern. One cannot create solidarity through law. However, the Court of Justice 
should be able to make morally informed judgements and clarify what solidarity within the 
legal construct should entail.  
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In doing so, the Court is interpreting the treaties without being falsely accused of being an 
activist Court. Nevertheless, such morally informed judgements and interpretations may not 
resonate if the political will or legitimacy behind such decisions are weak. However, as a 
matter of its judicial role the Court should clarify what European Union law is and in 
particular what a principle of solidarity does.  The important problem to be solved is to 
separate what solidarity as a principle can do from what it actually is. If solidarity is a 
principle not to be coerced but open to coercion, it functions as a legitimate reminder of the 
Treaty obligations set forth that incorporat both the principle of sincere cooperation as well as 
the principle of proportionality. A development of this nature for the interpretation of 
European Union law may also be problematic. There are clear boundary issues to this 
principle as a legal notion of which one must be made aware. Solidarity as a principle of 
European Union law does not mean a complete harmonisation of various measures but rather 
an examination of whether these measures do not undermine the objective set forth.  
 
It is in that sense that we should understand solidarity as a legal principle. These, more subtle 
distinctions can no longer be ignored and their development in the case law should be closely 
followed. The fact remains that the European Union is more than the sum of its parts. It is not 
always the case that a satisfying cost benefit calculation can be made, that what is lost 
automatically will be gained, that advantages always outnumber obligations. Solidarity is 
currently making a spectacular emergence as a separate legal principle of European Union 
law. Its role is not only to serve as a reminder of the moral obligations European integration 
entails but also to soften an approach that has too-long been based on calculations of 
advantages without regard of the burdens of obligation adherence to the Treaties may entail. 
As such, the following serves as a basis for the interpretation of solidarity as a legal principle 
in this thesis. A test of solidarity has been gestated and born through the interpretative lenses 
of the European Court of Justice.  
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